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For decades farm earnings have often been depressed by pro-urban, anti-agricultural 
biases of government policies in developing countries. True, progress has been made 
since the latter 1980s by many countries in reducing the policy bias, and indeed these 
changes have been transformational in China and to a lesser extent in India. But many 
trade-reducing price distortions remain between sectors, as well as within the 
agricultural sector of low- and middle-income countries, including in Asia. This 
matters for the majority of households in the world, because 45 percent of the global 
workforce is employed in agriculture and 75 percent of the world’s poorest 
households depend directly or indirectly on farming for their livelihoods. It matters 
even more in Asia’s developing economies where 60 percent of the workforce and 81 
percent of the poor (625 million people earning less than $1/day) are engaged in 
agriculture (World Bank 2007, Chen and Ravallion 2007). 
  This study is part of a global research project seeking to understand the 
changing extent and the effects of the policy bias against agriculture and the reasons 
behind the policy reforms in Africa, Europe’s transition economies, and Latin 
America and the Caribbean, as well as in Asia.
1 One purpose of the project is to 
obtain quantitative indicators of past and recent policy interventions. A second 
objective is to gain a deeper understanding of the political economy of trends in 
distortions to agricultural incentives in different national settings. Our third purpose is 
to use this deeper understanding to explore the prospects for further reducing the 
distortions to agricultural incentives and discover the likely implications for 
agricultural competitiveness, inequality and poverty alleviation in the major countries 
of the world. 
                                                 
1 The other three regional studies are Anderson and Masters (2008), Anderson and Swinnen (2008), 
and Anderson and Valdés (2008). Together with comparable studies of high-income countries (which 





  The compilation of new annual time series estimates of protection and taxation 
of farmers over the past half century is a core component of the first stage of this 
research project. These estimates are used to help address such questions as the 
following: Where is there still a policy bias against agricultural production? To what 
extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some developing-country food 
producers are now being protected from import competition along the lines of the 
examples of earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the political economy 
forces behind the more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those in 
less-successful countries where major distortions in agricultural incentives remain? 
Over the past two decades, how important have domestic political forces been in 
bringing about reform relative to international forces (such as loan conditionality, 
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, regional integration agreements, accession to the World Trade Organization, 
and the globalization of supermarkets and other firms along the value chain) and 
compared with forces operating in earlier decades? What explains the pattern of 
distortions within the agricultural sector of each country? What policy lessons and 
trade implications may be drawn from these differing experiences with a view to 
ensuring better growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing outcomes—including less 
overshooting that results in protectionist regimes—in Asian and other still-distorted 
developing countries during their reforms in the future? 
  The study is timely for at least four reasons. One is because the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) is in the midst of the Doha round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, and agricultural policy reform is one of the most contentious issues in 
those talks. Second, countries are seeking to position themselves favorably also in 
preferential trade negotiations, and in the wake of other forces of globalization such as 
the information, communication, agricultural-biotechnology and supermarket 
revolutions. Third, poorer countries and their development partners are striving to 
achieve their United Nations–encouraged Millennium Development Goals by 2015, 
the prime ones being the alleviation of hunger and poverty. And fourth, the outputs of 
the study are timely also because world food prices have spiked in 2008 at very high 
levels and governments in some developing countries, in their panic to deal with the 
inevitable protests from consumers, have reacted in far from optimal ways. Such 
spikes have occurred in the past, most notably in 1973-74, and lessons as to what 





The empirical estimates reported here reveal that governments in Asia have differed 
in their past responses to such shocks, although much less so with respect to rice, the 
region’s main staple. 
  The Asian part of this study is based on a sample of twelve developing 
economies. We exclude Japan, which was a high income country throughout our 
review period and so is analyzed separately as part of the high-income group in the 
project’s global overview volume (Anderson 2009a). In Northeast Asia we include the 
People’s Republic of China (the mainland excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, 
herein referred to as China), the Republic of Korea (the southern part of the Korean 
peninsula, herein referred to as Korea) and Taiwan Province of China (herein referred 
to as Taiwan). We include for Southeast Asia the five large economies of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, while for South Asia we include the 
four largest economies of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In 2000–04 
these economies (all of which are now WTO members) together accounted for more 
than 95 percent of the agricultural value added, farm households, total population and 
total gross domestic product (GDP) of Asia.
2 Estimates of distortions are provided for 
as many years as data permit over the past five decades (an average of 42 years), and 
for an average of 8 crop and livestock products per economy which in aggregate 
amounts to about 70 percent of the gross value of agricultural production in each of 
those economies. The time series and country coverage greatly exceed that of earlier 
studies such as Anderson and Hayami (1986), Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1991), 
Orden et al. (2007), and OECD (2007); and the product coverage is broader in each of 
the present case studies than in all earlier ones other than the OECD’s.
3 
  The key characteristics of these economies—which accounted in 2000-04 for 
only 10 percent of worldwide GDP but 37 percent of agricultural value added, 51 
                                                 
2 Apart from the urban islands of Hong Kong and Singapore, the omitted Asian and Pacific economies 
with popuations above one million are thus North Korea, Mongolia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua 
New Guinea, Afghanistan, and Nepal – which together contributed in 2004 less than 5 percent of the 
population, 4 percent of agricultural GDP and 2 percent of total GDP of all Asian and Pacific 
developing economies.  
3 Anderson and Hayami (1986) only examine Japan, Korea and Taiwan and only from 1955 to 1982 
(apart from providing rice distortion estimates back a further five decades); Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 
(1991) analyse Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand but for only 4 or 5 
crops from 1960 to 1984; Orden et al. (2007) provide producer support estimates for just China, India, 
Indonesia and Vietnam and for the period since 1985; and the OECD (2007) has been covering its two 
Asian members, Japan and Korea, since 1986 (but has also begun examining China – see OECD 2005). 
All of these earlier studies show the average nominal rate of assistance to farmers being higher in 
higher-income settings and where agricultural comparative advantage is weaker, and to be much higher 





percent of the global population and 73 percent of the world’s farmers—are shown in 
table 1.1. The table reveals the considerable diversity within the region in terms of 
stages of development, relative resource endowments, comparative advantages and 
hence trade specialization, and the incidence of poverty and income inequality. These 
economies thus provide a rich sample for comparative study.  
Per capita incomes in Bangladesh, India and Vietnam are barely one-twelfth 
the global average. In Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka it is around one-sixth, 
whereas in China it is more than one-quarter, in Thailand more than one-third, and in 
Malaysia around three-quarters of the world average. Korea and Taiwan look 
exceptional in that they currently have more than twice the global average per capita 
income, but it needs to be remembered that in the 1950s, at the start of the period 
under study, those two economies were among the poorest in the world.  
In terms of endowments of agricultural land per capita, Korea and Taiwan are 
again exceptional in having only one-twentieth of the global average endowment 
ratio. Bangladesh has only a little more, followed by Sri Lanka and the Philippines. 
Even Indonesia, India and Pakistan have only about one-quarter of the global average 
endowment, while Malaysia and Thailand have about two-fifths and China one-half.
4 
That is, none of these Asian economies are relatively well endowed with crop or 
pasture land, and on a per capita basis the region has only one-third the global 
average. This might suggest Asian economies would have a low comparative 
advantage in agricultural goods, were it not for two facts: these economies are at 
varying stages of industrial development, and the quality of and institutional 
arrangements/entitlement to their land and water vary greatly. As a result, so too do 
their strengths in terms of agricultural competitiveness. Those differences are 
reflected in the indexes of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and trade 
specialization shown in table 1.1. A majority of our focus economies have an RCA 
index well above 100, indicating the extent to which the share of agricultural and food 
products in the country’s merchandise trade exceeds the global average share, but for 
Korea and Taiwan that index is below 30 and for China and the Philippines it is 
around 60. The index of agricultural trade specialization (net exports as a ratio of 
exports plus imports of farm products, and so ranging between -1 and +1) is positive 
                                                 
4 In terms of overall (as distinct from just crop and pasture) land endowment per capita, China is only 





for half of our focus economies but is as low as -0.7 for Bangladesh, Korea and 
Taiwan. 
Income inequality has risen a little over the past two decades but is still low 
throughout much of the region compared with the rest of the world: as of 2004, the 
Gini coefficient is between 0.40 and 0.49 for Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and 
Thailand and averages between 0.31 and 0.37 for the rest of the region. The regional 
average of 0.36 contrasts with, for example, an average of 0.52 for Latin America. 
Likewise, the Gini coefficient for land distribution is relatively low in Asia, at just 
0.41 for China and Pakistan and below 0.50 also in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand. Vietnam is just on 0.5, and India is 0.58, but even these imply 
reasonably even distributions of land, compared with in Latin America where the Gini 
coefficient for land distribution is above 0.7 for the major countries such as Argentina 
and Brazil and possibly for the region as a whole (World Bank 2007). A significant 
proportion of the rural population is landless in South Asia, however, so 31 percent of 
that sub-continent’s population was still living on less than $1 a day in 2004 
compared with just 9 percent in East Asia (table 1.1). 
The extent of poverty decline in Asia since 1981 has been unprecedented in 
world history. The number of Asian people living on less than $1/day (1993 PPP) has 
halved since then. Most of that decline has been in East Asia, especially China, and 
represents a decline from 58 to less than 10 percent of the population; but even in 
South Asia the proportion has fallen from one-half to less than one-third (table 1.2). 
During the ten years to 2002, no less than three-quarters of that decline in the 
proportion of Asia’s poor occurred in rural areas, and another one-sixth was due to a 
movement out of poverty by rural people migrating to better opportunities in urban 
areas (Chen and Ravallion 2007). 
Policy developments have made non-trivial contributions to the growth, 
structural changes and poverty alleviation observed in Asia over the past five decades. 
The transformational move away from planning and state-owned enterprises to greater 
dependence on markets and private entrepreneurship has had a particularly dramatic 
effect in China and Vietnam from the 1980s, but India too has been benefiting from 
similar reforms from the early 1990s. Also important has been the move in market 
economies away from import-substituting industrialization towards export-oriented 
development strategies, beginning in Taiwan around 1960 and soon followed by 





Agricultural policies were not the only – or even the main – target of these reforms, 
but they were an integral part of the process. 
This chapter begins with a brief summary of economic growth and structural 
changes in the region since the 1950s and of agricultural and other economic policies 
as they affected agriculture before and after the various reforms – and in several cases 
fundamental regime changes – of the past half-century.
5 It then introduces the 
methodology used by the authors of the individual country studies to estimate the 
nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and the relative rate of assistance (RRA) to farmers 
delivered by national farm and nonfarm policies over the past several decades 
(depending on data availability), as well as the impact of these policies on the 
consumer prices of farm products. Both farmer assistance and consumer taxation will 
be negative in periods where there is an anti-agricultural, pro-urban consumer bias in 
a country’s policy regime. The chapter subsequently provides a synopsis of the 
empirical results detailed in the country studies in this volume, without attempting to 
also survey the myriad policy changes discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
The final sections summarize what we have learned and draw out implications of the 
findings, including for poverty and inequality and for possible future directions of 
policies affecting agricultural incentives in Asia. 
 
 




The most striking economic characteristic of Asia’s developing economies, and 
especially those in East Asia, is their rates of economic growth and industrial 
development over the past three decades (and even longer for Korea and Taiwan). The 
recent report of the Commission on Growth and Development (Spence 2008) noted 
that 13 of the world’s economies have had sustained growth of real per capita income 
of more than 7 percent for at least 25 consecutive years since World War II, and nine 
                                                 
5 Apart from the regime changes that occurred during this period, such as the move from socialism to 
the market in China and Vietnam, and the opening of India and several other economies, the region saw 
the end of colonization between the late 1940s and late 1950s: Korea and Taiwan from Japan in 1945, 
India and Pakistan from Britain in 1947, Indonesia from the Netherlands in 1949, Indochina from 
France in 1954, and Malaya from Britain in 1957. 





of those are East Asian.
7 Between 1980 and 2004, East Asia’s per capita GDP grew at 
6.3 percent per year and South Asia’s at 3.4 percent, which contrasts with the global 
average of just 1.4 percent. Asia’s industrial growth in that period was 8.6 percent per 
year compared with the world’s 2.5 percent; and even agricultural growth in Asia was 
more than half as high again as in the world as a whole (3.1 compared with 2.0 
percent per year – see table 1.3). A consequence is that per capita incomes of some 
Asian economies have been converging rapidly – albeit from a low base – on those of 
rich countries, while other developing and transition economies have, on average been 
slipping further away from the US level (figure 1.1). 
A key driver of the rapid growth and industrialization of Asia has been the 
decision by many countries of the region to become more open and switch away from 
an import-substituting development strategy to one that is export oriented. That 
change occurred at different times in our focus countries, beginning with Taiwan and 
then Korea in the 1960s. China joined the group from the late 1970s, Vietnam in the 
mid-1980s, and India haltingly in the early 1980s but more concertedly from 1991. As 
a result, export volumes grew at double-digit rates (last column of table 1.3); the share 
of exports in GDP rose steadily for the region, more than doubling in the 30 years to 
2004 (table 1.4); and the East Asian region’s share of global exports of non-food 
manufactures has quadrupled since 1990, thanks especially to China’s 
industrialization. China in 2006 accounted for 11 percent of the world’s 
manufacturing exports, compared with less than 1 percent in 1990: a twenty-fold 
increase in current dollar terms. But the increase for all our other focus countries in 
Asia has averaged nearly five-fold, and all of them have contributed to the region’s 
growing share of global manufacturing exports since 1990 (table 1.5).
8 
  With that export-led growth has come dramatic restructuring of Asia’s 
economies away from agriculture and towards not only manufacturing but also service 
activities. In East Asia the farm sector’s share of GDP is now less than 30 percent of 
what it was in the latter 1960s, and even in slower-growing South Asia it has less than 
halved over that period. The biggest changes are in China and Indonesia, where 
agriculture’s shares of GDP have dropped from more than 40 and 50 percent, 
respectively, in the 1960s to 13 percent by 2005. Bangladesh also has transformed 
                                                 
7 The nine are Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Brazil is the only other large economy in the set, the other three being Botswana, Malta and Oman. 
8 By contrast, the focus countries of Asia’s share of global exports of agricultural and food products has 





remarkably: agriculture’s share was 54 percent in 1965-69 when all other non-service 
industries accounted for just 9 percent, and now industry’s share is well above 
agriculture’s (27 versus 20 percent in 2005). Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, 
being the slowest-growing of our focus economies, have been the slowest to move 
away from agriculture since the 1960s. At the other extreme are Korea and Taiwan, 
which now have only 2 or 3 percent of their GDP coming from farming. For Asia as a 
whole, agriculture is now less than one-eighth of GDP (down from more than one-
third in the late 1960s), industry has risen from 27 to 38 percent, and services from 35 
to 49 percent (table 1.6). 
  The shares of overall employment accounted for by farming activities have 
fallen somewhat more slowly than agriculture’s GDP shares, according to statistics in 
the FAOSTAT Database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (which, because of definitional differences, is not always consistent with 
databases within countries). These shares remain at much higher levels than the GDP 
shares, implying relatively low and labor productivity on farms. The most rapid 
declines have occurred in Korea and Taiwan, where the employment share in 
agriculture has fallen from around 50 percent to less than ten percent during the past 
40 years. Malaysia too has seen a major fall, from 57 to 18 percent of the workforce. 
Elsewhere in Asia, however, a very large share of employment remains predominantly 
in farming (table 1.7). These shares would be somewhat less in full-time equivalent 
terms when more-careful account is taken of part-time off-farm work activities (see, 
e.g., Otsuka 2006), but nonetheless they underscore the importance of incentives 
faced by farmers for the well-being of the majority of Asia’s households. 
  Agriculture’s average share in Asia’s merchandise exports has declined even 
more dramatically than the GDP share, from 45 percent to just 7 percent in the past 
four decades. During that period the share of non-primary goods has doubled, to 85 
percent. Among our 12 focus countries, only natural resource-rich Indonesia has less 
than three-quarters of its exports coming from such goods (table 1.8). The declining 
relative importance of farm exports has been much more rapid in Asia than in the rest 
of the world: the index of the revealed agricultural comparative advantage for Asia 
(defined as the share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio of 





1980s by about two-thirds in East Asia and one-third in South Asia. So too has the 
index of agricultural trade specialization (defined as net exports divided by the sum of 
the imports and exports of agricultural and processed food products). That index, 
which ranges from -1 to +1, has become increasingly less positive or has become 
negative in virtually all our focus countries over recent decades (table 1.9).  
  That apparent decline in agricultural comparative advantage is evident in the 
self-sufficiency data for primary farm products. Until 30 years ago the region was 
almost exactly 100 percent self-sufficient in farm products, but since then that 
indicator has declined to less than 85 percent. The share of farm production exported 
has not changed much, averaging in the 4-6 percent range (although there have been 
substantial changes in individual countries, with declines in Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Sri Lanka and Taiwan offset by increases in countries such as Vietnam, Thailand and 
China). By contrast, since the latter 1970s the share of imports in domestic 
consumption of farm products has quadrupled, to around 20 percent (table 1.10). 
  As will become clear below, the increasing dependence on imports of farm 
products in Asia has occurred despite reductions in the taxation of agricultural exports 
and increases in incentives provided to farmers via government policy reforms. These 
reforms probably have contributed to poverty alleviation in Asia. Using a simpler 
price indicator than developed below, Ravallion and Chen (2007) show that the 
reduction in the anti-agricultural bias in farm price policies has contributed 
significantly to China’s poverty reduction. As well, rural growth has been shown to be 
a key contributor to the reduction in poverty in India (Ravallion and Datt 1996). These 
types of studies will be able to be revisited using the more comprehensive set of 
measures of the extent of changes in distortions to agricultural incentives summarized 
below. To generate those measures, a common methodology was adopted by the 
authors of the country case studies in this volume. A summary of the methodology 
follows, and further details can be found in Anderson et al. (2008) which is 
reproduced as Appendix 1 in this book. 
    
 







The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is defined as the percentage by which 
government policies have raised gross returns to producers above what they would be 
without the government’s intervention (or lowered them, if NRA<0). If a trade 
measure is the sole source of government intervention, then the measured NRA will 
also be the consumer tax equivalent (CTE) rate at that same point in the value chain. 
But where there are also domestic producer or consumer taxes or subsidies, the NRA 
and CTE will no longer be equal and at least one of them will be different from the 
price distortion at the border due to trade measures.
9  
There are several purposes for which NRAs and CTEs can be used, and the 
purpose chose affects the appropriate choice of methodology. This project uses them 
to achieve three purposes. One is to generate a comparable set of numbers across a 
wide range of countries and over a long time period, with the consequence that the 
methodology needs to be both simple and somewhat flexible. Another purpose is to 
provide a single number to indicate the total extent of transfer to (or from) farmers 
due to agricultural policies – the NRA; and another number for the extent of transfer 
to (or from) consumers – the CTE. Both are expressed either as a percentage of the 
undistorted price or in dollar terms. This is what the OECD’s PSE and CSE do, both 
of which can be negative when transfers from exceed transfers to the relevant group. 
This research project’s agricultural NRA and CTE are similar in spirit to the OECD’s 
PSE and CSE but with some important differences outlined below. And the third 
purpose is to enable economic modelers to use the NRAs for individual primary and 
lightly processed agricultural products as producer price wedges, and the CTEs as 
consumer price wedges, in single-sector, multi-sector and economy-wide policy 
simulation models by allocating those wedges to particular policy instruments such as 
trade taxes or domestic producer or consumer subsidies. 
The NRAs are based on estimates of assistance to individual industries. Great 
care has gone into generating the NRA for each covered agricultural industry, 
particularly in countries where trade costs are high, pass-through along the value 
                                                 
9 Our definition of a policy-induced price distortion follows Bhagwati (1971) and Corden (1997) and 
includes any policy measure at a country’s border (such as a trade tax or subsidy, a quantitative 
restriction on trade, or a dual or multiple foreign exchange rate system, assuming the country is small 
enough to have no monopoly power in international markets), or any domestic producer or consumer 
tax/subsidy/restraint on output, intermediate inputs or primary factors of production (except where 
needed to directly overcome an externality, or where it is set optimally across all products or factors, 





chain is affected by imperfect competition, and markets for foreign currency have 
been highly distorted at various times and to varying degrees in the past.  
Most distortions to industries producing tradables come from trade measures, 
such as a tariff imposed on the cif import price or an export subsidy or tax imposed on 
the fob price at the country’s border, or quantitative restrictions on trade. Since an ad 
valorem tariff or export subsidy is the equivalent of a production subsidy and a 
consumption tax of the same rate expressed as a percentage of the border price, it is 
that which is captured in the NRA and CTE at the point in the value chain where the 
product is first traded. To get the NRA for the farmer, authors of the country studies 
estimated or guessed the extent of pass-through back to the farm gate, and added any 
domestic farm output subsidies. To obtain the CTE they also added any product-
specific domestic consumer taxes to the distortion from border measures. Note that 
the NRA and CTE differs from the OECD’s PSE and CSE in that the latter pair are 
expressed as a percentage of the distorted price and hence will be lower (for positive 
protection rates) than the former pair which are expressed as percentages of the 
undistorted price.  
We decided against seeking estimates of the more complex effective rate of 
assistance (ERA) even though it is, in principle, a better partial equilibrium single 
measure of distortions to producer incentives than the nominal rate. The reason is that 
to do so requires knowing each product’s value added and various intermediate input 
shares of output. Such data are not available for most developing countries even every 
few years, let alone for every year in the long time series that is the focus of this 
study. And in most countries distortions to farm inputs are very small compared with 
distortions to farm output prices. But where there are significant product-specific 
distortions to input costs, they are captured by estimating their equivalence in terms of 
a higher output price and including that in the NRA for individual agricultural 
industries wherever data allow. Any non-product-specific distortions, including 
distortions to farm input prices, are also added into the estimate for the overall 
sectoral NRA for agriculture as a whole. 
The targeted minimum coverage of products for NRA estimates was 70 
percent, based on the gross value of farm production at undistorted prices. This target 
degree of coverage is similar to that for the OECD’s PSEs. Unlike the OECD, 
however, in this project we do not routinely assume that the nominal assistance for 





in developing countries the agricultural policies affecting the non-covered products 
are often very different from those for covered products. For example, nontradables 
among non-covered farm goods (often highly perishable or low-valued products 
relative to their transport cost) are often not subject to direct distortionary policies. 
The authors of the country case studies were asked to provide three sets of 
‘guesstimates’ of the NRAs for non-covered farm products, one each for the import-
competing, exportable and nontradable sub-sectors. Weighted averages for all 
agricultural products were then generated, using the gross values of production at 
unassisted prices as weights. For countries that also provide non-product-specific 
agricultural subsidies or taxes (assumed to be shared on a pro-rata basis between 
tradables and nontradables) or assistance decoupled from production, such net 
assistance is then added to product-specific assistance to get a NRA for total 
agriculture, and also for tradable agriculture for use in generating the Relative Rate of 
Assistance (RRA, defined below).   
How best to present regional aggregate NRA and RRA estimates depends on 
the purpose for which the averages are required. We generate a weighted 
averageNRA for covered products for each country, because only then can we add 
theNRAfor non-covered products and from non-product-specific assistance to get 
theNRA for all agriculture. When it comes to averaging across countries, each polity 
is an observation of interest, so a simple average is meaningful for the purpose of 
political economy analysis. But if one wants a sense of how distorted a whole region’s 
agriculture is, a weighted average is needed. The weighted average NRA for covered 
primary agriculture can be generated by multiplying each primary industry’s share of 
the gross value of production (valued at the farm-gate equivalent undistorted prices) 
by its corresponding NRA and adding across industries.
10 The overall sectoral rate, 
which we denoteNRAag , can be obtained by adding also the actual or assumed 
information for the non-covered farm commodities and, where it exists, the aggregate 
value of non-product-specific and decoupled assistance to agriculture. 
                                                 
10 Corden (1971) proposed that free-trade volume be used as weights, but since they are not observable 
(and an economy-wide model is needed to estimate them) the common practice is to compromise by 
using actual distorted volumes but undistorted unit values or, equivalently, distorted values divided by 
(1+ NRA). If estimates of own-and cross-price elasticities of demand and supply are available, a partial 
equilibrium estimate of the quantity at undistorted could be generated, but if those estimated elasticities 





A weighted average can be similarly generated for the tradables part of 
agriculture – including those industries producing products such as milk and sugar 
that require only light processing before they can be traded – by assuming that its 
share of non-product-specific assistance equals its weight in the total. Call 
that
t NRAag .  
In addition to the mean, it is important to provide also a measure of the 
dispersion or variability of the NRA estimates across the covered products. The cost 
of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tend 
to be greater the greater the degree of substitution in production (Lloyd 1974). In the 
case of agriculture which involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but 
transferable among farm activities, the greater the variation of  NRAs  across industries 
within the sector then the higher will be the welfare cost of those market 
interventions. A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard deviation of the covered 
industries’ NRAs .  
Each industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of 
exportables, or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over 
the years), so that it is possible to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs 
for the two different groups of tradables. Those NRAs are used to generate a trade 
bias index, TBI, defined in percentage terms as: 
(2)    TBI = 100[(1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1] 
where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-
competing and exportables parts of the agricultural sector. The TBI indicates in a 
single number the extent to which the typically anti-trade bias (negative TBI) in 
agricultural policies changes over time.  
Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own outputs but also, albeit 
indirectly via changes to factor market prices and the exchange rate, by the incentives 
nonagricultural producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of 
government assistance that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago 
Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved that in a two-sector 
economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a 
model that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables, to a model with 
imperfect competition, and regardless of the economy’s size (Vousden 1990, pp. 46-





that the value shares of agricultural and non-agricultural nontradable products remain 
constant, then the economy-wide effect of distortions to agricultural incentives can be 
captured by the extent to which the tradable parts of agricultural production are 
assisted or taxed relative to producers of other tradables. By generating estimates of 
the average NRA for non-agricultural tradables, it is then possible to calculate a 
Relative Rate of Assistance, RRA, defined in percentage terms as: 
(1)    RRA = 100[(1+NRAag
t/100)/(1+NRAnonag
t/100) – 1] 
where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the weighted average percentage NRAs for the 
tradable parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. Since the 
NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can 
the RRA (assuming NRAnonag
t is positive). And if both of those sectors are equally 
assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if it is below (above) zero, it 
provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to which a country’s 
policy regime has an anti- (pro-)agricultural bias. 
In calculating the NRA for producers of agricultural and non-agricultural 
tradables, the methodology outlined in Appendix 1 sought to include distortions 
generated by dual or multiple exchange rates. Such direct interventions in the market 
for foreign currency were common in some Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s, 
including China. However, authors of some of the focus country studies had difficulty 
finding an appropriate estimate of the extent of that distortion, so the impact of that on 
NRAs has not been included for all. Its exclusion for some countries (e.g., India) 
means their estimated (typically) positive NRAs for importables and (typically) 
negative NRAs for exportables are smaller than they should be. In cases where the 
NRA for importables dominates that for exportables, this omission would lead to an 
underestimate of the average (positive) NRA for such tradables sectors, and 
conversely. And in either case it leads to an underestimate of the (anti-)trade bias 
index. 
To obtain dollar values of farmer assistance and consumer taxation, 
Valenzuela, Croser and Anderson (2008) have taken the country authors’ estimates of 
NRA and multiplied them by the gross value of production at undistorted prices to 
obtain an estimate in current US dollars of the direct gross subsidy equivalent of 
assistance to farmers (GSE). This is then added up across products for a country and 





the studied economies. These GSE values are calculated in current and constant 
dollars, and are also expressed on per-farm-worker basis. 
  To obtain comparable dollar value estimates of the consumer transfer, the CTE
 
estimate at the point at which a product is first traded is multiplied by consumption 
(obtained from the FAO’s supply and utilization database) valued at undistorted prices 
to obtain an estimate in current US dollars of the tax equivalent to consumers of 
primary farm products (TEC). This too is added up across products for a country, and 
across countries for any or all products, to get regional aggregate transfer estimates 
for the studied economies. These TEC values are also expressed on per capita basis. 
 
 
Estimates of Asian policy indicators 
 
 
We begin with the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, then compare them with 
the nominal rates for non-agricultural tradables. Dollar equivalents of 
assistance/taxation to farmers are also presented, and so too are the consumer tax 
equivalents of policies as they affect buyers of farm products. 
 
Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture 
 
Agricultural price and trade policies reduced farmers earnings throughout the period 
to the 1980s in developing Asia,
11 on average by more than 20 percent; but that 
implicit taxation declined from the early 1980s and, from the mid-1990s, the NRA 
switched sign and became increasingly positive. The average hides considerable 
diversity within the region, however. Nominal assistance to farmers in Korea and 
Taiwan was positive from the early 1960s (although very small initially), Indonesia 
had some years in the 1970s and 1980s when its NRA was a little above zero (as did 
Pakistan prior to Bangladesh becoming an independent country in1971), and India’s 
and the Philippines’ average NRAs became positive from the 1980s (table 1.11). A 
visual impression of both the differences across countries and the rise in average 
NRAs is clear in figure 1.2, where 2000-04 is compared with 1980-84. This trend is 
                                                 
11 Recall that the use of the word ‘Asia’ throughout this chapter and volume is shorthand for our focus 





present for the vast majority of the commodity NRAs for the region too, with meat 
and milk the only products to have seen their assistance rates cut over that period 
(figure 1.3). 
Figure 1.3 also illustrates the diversity of the region’s average NRAs across 
farm commodities. As is true for other regions of the world, assistance is among the 
highest for the ‘rice pudding’ products of sugar, milk and rice. But even for those 
three products there is a great diversity across countries in their NRAs, with 5-year 
averages ranging from almost zero to as much as 400 percent for rice and 140 percent 
for milk in Korea, and to 230 percent for sugar in Bangladesh (figure 1.4). This 
suggests the production of these products within Asia may be far from optimally 
allocated from the viewpoint of efficient resource use. 
  There is a great deal of NRA diversity also across economies in their average 
NRA, and across commodities within each Asian economy’s farm sector, and the 
extent of both types of diversity (as measured by the standard deviation) has grown 
rather that diminished over the past five decades. The cross-economy diversity of 
average NRAs is evident from the bottom of table 1.11 (weighted average rising from 
around 25 percent in the early years under study to around 40 percent in recent years); 
and the cross-commodity diversity within each economy is clear from table 1.12 
(unweighted average), where the standard deviation of NRAs is reported for covered 
products (which account for up to three-quarters of the value of agricultural 
production at undistorted prices). It means that there is still much that could be gained 
from improved resource reallocation both between economies and within the 
agricultural sector of Asian economies, were differences in rates of assistance to be 
reduced. 
  A striking feature of the distortion pattern within the farm sector is its strong 
anti-trade bias. This is evident in figure 1.5, which depicts the average NRAs for 
agriculture’s import-competing and export sub-sectors for the region: the former 
average is always positive and its trend is upward-sloping, whereas the NRA average 
for exportables is negative and became moreso in the 1980s before gradually 
approaching zero thereafter. While the gap between the NRAs for those two sub-
sectors has diminished little since the 1960s for the region as a whole, there are 
nonetheless several countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) for which that 
gap has narrowed and hence their trade bias index has come closer to zero (table 





  The rise in the average NRAs since the 1980s is too large to be explained just 
by economies losing their comparative advantage in farm products as they 
industrialize. As shown in the ‘export share’ rows of table 1.13, the proportion of 
tradable farm production that is produced by the export sub-sector has not declined 
very much for most Asian economies. This suggests that the main motive for 
interevention cannot be revenue raising via trade taxes. Nor can it be solely to reduce 
distortions, for otherwise we would not have seen an ‘overshooting’, in going from 
taxing to assisting farmers on average, nor would we have seen an increase in 
assistance to import-competing farmers. 
The contributions to the overall NRA for agriculture from input subsidies, 
from domestic output taxes or subsidies, and from trade measures at the economy’s 
border are summarized in table 1.14. (Non-product-specific assistance, not shown 
there, added only around two percentage points during the period of the study.) 
Product-specific input price distortions contributed little on average to the overall 
regional NRA for agriculture, reducing its negative value slightly in the 1960s and 
adding slightly to its positive value during the past decade or so. India is where the 
contribution of input subsidies is largest, especially in recent years when they have 
added almost 10 pecentage points to the sector’s NRA and have been a non-trivial 
item in the government’s overall budget. Earlier they were high for Indonesia too, 
peaking at 7 percentage points in the 1980s before reforms brought them back to just 
2 percentage points in recent years. There is even less in the way of domestic output 
subsidies on average in the region now, although there had been some in earlier 
decades in both India and Sri Lanka – while in China output taxes in kind were 
prevelant until very recently (table 1.14). 
The US dollar value equivalent of the positive or negative assistance to 
farmers due to agricultural price and trade policies has been non-trivial. The anti-
agricultural bias peaked for the region in the latter 1970s at more than $130 billion per 
year in constant dollar terms (expressed in 2000 US dollars – see bottom row of table 
1.15(a)). That is equivalent to a gross tax of around $170 for each person engaged in 
agriculture. Most of that $130 billion was due to China’s anti-agricultural policies, 
with India the second biggest contributor in the 1960s and 1970s. Thanks to the 
reforms of the past two decades, such taxation has gradually disappeared in all our 
focus countries. But the reform does not mean there is no intervention now. Rather, 





most countries, totalling around $60 billion per year, with China, India and Korea 
each contributing about one-quarter of that total. In recent years the total has averaged 
around $60 per farm worker in Asia. That $60 is not small compared with per capita 
income for the region, but it is very unevenly distributed: it ranges from between 
$6900 and $5300 for farmers in Korea and Taiwan (more than one-third of those 
economies’ per capita income) to around $150 in the Philippines, $90 in Indonesia, 
$60 in Malaysia, India and Vietnam, and virtually zero in Thailand, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan (table 1.15(b)).  
Which products contribute to the Asia’s positive or negative assistance to 
farmers due to agricultural price and trade policies? Table 1.15(c) shows that the 
negative contribution comes mainly from policies directly affecting the exportable 
parts of Asian agriculture, while most of the positive contribution comes from 
protecting import-competing producers. The NRAs by product, shown in Table 
1.16(a), give some insight into which products are responsible, but they need to be 
combined with information on each product’s share of the gross value of production 
(see Appendix 2) to obtain the dollar contributions by product that are shown in Table 
1.16(b). Clearly rice, milk and sugar again are the most assisted industries today. But 
note that back in the early 1980s, when China was still heavily taxing its farmers, the 
net contribution of rice was negative and large. At that time poicies affecting pigmeat, 
and fruits and vegetables, were equally large contributors to the effective taxation of 
Asian farmers, again almost entirely because of China’s influence. 
 
Assistance to non-farm sectors and relative rates of assistance 
 
The anti-agricultural policy biases of the past were due not just to agricultural 
policies. Also important to changes in incentives afffecting inter-sectorally mobile 
resources have been the significant reductions in border protection to the 
manufacturing sector (which has been the dominant intervention in the tradables part 
of non-agricultural sectors). That reduction in assistance to producers of non-farm 
tradables has been even more responsible for the improvement in farmer incentives 
than the reduction in direct taxation of agricultural industries. 
  It has not been possible to quantifying the distortions to non-farm tradable 
sectors as carefully as for agriculture. Authors typically have had to rely on applied 





comparisons, and hence they usually do not capture the quantitative restrictions on 
trade which were important in earlier decades but decreasingly so through recent 
times.
12 Nor do they capture distortions in the services sectors, some of which now 
produce tradables (or would do in the absence of interventions preventing their 
emergence). As a result the estimated NRAs for non-farm importables are smaller and 
decline less rapidly than in fact was the case – and likewise for non-farm exportables, 
except their NRAs in some cases would have been negative. Of those two elements of 
under-estimation, the former bias certainly dominates, so the authors’ estimate of the 
overall NRA for non-agricultural tradables should be considered a lower-bound 
estimate, and more so in the past so that its decline is less rapid than it should be.
13  
Despite these methodological limitations, the estimated NRAs for non-farm 
tradables are very sizeable prior to the 1990s. For Asia as a whole, the average NRA 
value has steadily declined throughout the past four or five decades as policy reforms 
have spread. This has therefore contributed to a decline in the estimated negative 
relative rate of assistance for farmers: the weighted average RRA has was worse than 
-50 percent up to the early 1970s but improved to an average of -32 percent in the 
1980s, -9 percent in the 1990s and is now positive, averaging 7 percent in 2000-04 (or 
15 percent if the average is unweighted). The five-decade trends in RRAs and their 
two component NRAs for each economy are summarized in table 1.17. It is clear from 
figure 1.6 that the falling positive NRAs for non-farm producers has contributed even 
more to the rise of the RRA in Asia than has the gradual disappearance of the negative 
NRAs for farmers.  
Has the international location of production of farm products within Asia 
become more or less efficient as a results of policy changes over the past five 
decades? A global computable general equilibrium model with a time series of 
databases is needed to answer that question well. But one very crude way of 
addressing the question is to examine the standard deviation of RRAs across the 
economies of the region over time. That indicator suggests distortions have become 
                                                 
12 Also ignored are distortions to the prices of inputs into non-farm goods production, again in contrast 
to their treatment in estimating agricultural NRAs. 
13 This bias is accentuated in those cases where distortions to exchange rates are not included, as noted 
above in the methodology section. Exchange rate distortions were included in the studies for China, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Their impact was greatest in China, where it made the 
RRA more negative to the extent of about 2 percenatage points in the 1970s, 6 percentage points in the 





more dispersed across countries over time: it averaged 35 percent during 1960-74, 50 
percent during 1975-89 and 55 percent during 1990-2004 (final row of table 1.17). 
Of the striking changes in RRAs shown for individual economies over the past 
two decades in figure 1.7, it is the move from negative to positive RRAs for China 
and India that matter most for the region – and indeed for the world. The extent of the 
decline in the non-agricultural NRA since the early 1980s is very similar for those two 
key countries, but the agricultural NRA has differed: in China the 5-year averages 
have risen steadily from -45 percent to 6 percent, whereas in India it has been close to 
zero except for a spike upward when international food prices collapsed in the mid-
1980s and for a rise in the present decade (figure 1.8).  
This dramatic rise in the RRA for the world’s two most populous countries is 
of great significance to the current analyses of the causes of the international food 
price rises of the present decade. One of the contributors is said to be the growing 
appetite for food imports by these two countries as they industrialize and their per 
capita incomes rise. Yet as Table 1.10 shows, both countries have remained very close 
to self sufficient in agricultural products over the past four decades. Undoubtedly the 
steady rise in their RRAs has contributed to that outcome. It may also have helped 
ensure that the trend in China’s ratio of urban to rural mean incomes (adjusted for cost 
of living differences) has been flat since 1980 (Ravallion and Chen 2006, Figure 3), 
and that the Gini coefficient for India has hardly changed between 1984 and 2004 
(Table 1.1). A major question, to which we return at the end of the chapter, is: will 
their RRAs remain at their current neutral level of close to zero, or will they continue 
to rise in the same way as observed in Korea and Taiwan and, before them, in Japan 
and Western Europe?  
 
Comparisons with other regions 
 
The regional upward shift in agricultural NRAs and the RRAs towards zero and even 
the move to positive agricultural NRAs and RRAs recently are not unique to Asia. 
Figure 1.9 shows that similar trends, albeit less steep, have resulted from policy 
reforms in other developing country regions over the past four decades, suggesting 
that similar political economy trends might be at work as economies develop. This is 
despite the fact that farm-nonfarm houeshold income inequality is very different in 





agricultural NRAs and RRAs are positively correlated with per capita income and 
agricultural comparative disadvantage (Anderson 1995). A glance at table 1.18 
suggests that Asian economies have been – and continue to be – contributors to that 
trend. This is confirmed statistically in the simple regressions with country fixed 
effects shown in figure 1.11, and with the multiple regressions with country and time 
fixed effects shown in table 1.19. 
 
Consumer tax equivalents of agricultural policies 
 
The extent to which farm policies impact on the retail consumer price of food and on 
the price of livestock feedstuffs depends on a wide range of things including the 
degree of processing undertaken and the extent of competition along the value chain. 
We, like the OECD (2007), therefore attempt only to ask how much impact policies 
have on the buyer’s price at the point on the value chain where the farm product is 
first traded internationally and hence where comparisons are made between domestic 
and international prices (e.g., as milled rice, or raw sugar, or beef). To get weights to 
make it possible to sum up across commodities and countries, if they were not 
supplied from national sources we obtained consumption data either directly from the 
FAO food balance sheets or, in the case of minor products, indirectly by using FAO 
value of trade data and assuming the undistorted value of consumption is production 
valued at undistorted prices plus imports minus exports.  
If there were no farm input distortions and no domestic output price distortions 
so that the NRA was entirely the result of border measures such as an import or export 
tax or restriction, and there were no domestic consumption taxes or subsidies in place, 
then the CTE would equal the NRA for each covered product. But such domestic 
distortions are present in several Asian economies. In Korea, for example, producer 
prices have been well above consumer prices for several important crop products, 
while in China the opposite was true at least until the early 1990s: producers of food 
staples were taxed more than consumers were subsidized, even taking into account the 
‘iron rice bowl’ in-kind partial wage payment received by many urban workers.
14 
Also, because of international trade, the weights used to aggregate product distortion 
                                                 
14 It is true also that consumers received staple food at effectively subsidized prices in South Asia via 
‘fair price shops’. But these hand-outs from the government were rationed sufficiently to be mostly 
infra-marginal, and so are considered here as implicit income transfers rather than additional distortive 





rates on the consumption side differ from those on the production side of the market. 
Hence the aggregate CTE differs somewhat from the aggregate NRA for each 
economy, as can be seen by comparing the CTEs in table 1.20(a) with the NRAs in 
table 1.11. The weighted average CTE for the region is negative until the early 1990s, 
but above zero thereafter and increasingly so in recent years. The variance in CTEs 
across products is even more now than before the reforms of the past two decades (see 
table 1.20(b) including the bottom row).  
In proportional and in per capita terms the current transfers from consumers 
are clearly largest in Korea and Taiwan (tables 1.20(a) and 1.21(b)), but in dollar 
terms they are also large in China, India and Indonesia (table 1.21(a)). In the present 
decade the transfer on average from consumers to producers in the region amounts to 
around $35 billion per year. In the early 1980s, by contrast, the transfer was from 
producers to consumers, and amounted to $50 billion per year at the producer level for 
products covered in this project. Among the covered products, the biggest transfers 
are again for milk, rice and sugar (table 1.21(c)).  
 
The role of agricultural policies in stabilizing domestic prices 
 
An often-stated objective of food policies in Asia (and elsewhere) is to reduce 
fluctuations in domestic food prices and in the quantities available for consumption. 
Nowhere is that more obvious than in rice, for which fluctuations in trade barriers are 
frequently used as a buffer against domestic or international shocks, rather than using 
trade as a source of cheaper imports or an opportunity for export earnings. Since Asia 
produces and consumes four-fifths of the world’s rice (compared with about one-third 
of the world’s wheat and maize), this market-insulating behavior of Asian policy 
makers means that even by 2000-04 only 6.9 percent of global rice production was 
traded internationally
15 (compared with 14 and 24 percent for maize and wheat), and 
so international prices are much more volative for rice than for those other grains. 
This in turn means that nominal rates of protection for rice would be above trend in 
years of low international prices and conversely in years when international prices for 
rice are high. 
                                                 
15 This was up from the pre-1990s half-decade global shares which are all less than 4.5 percent (e.g., 
4.1 percent in 1985-89), and is greater than the Asian share of just 5.7 percent in 2000-04, according to 





  Figure 1.12 reveals that this indeed is the case. Even when averaging over all 
our focus countries in Southeast or South Asia, the negative correlation between the 
rice NRAs and the international rice price is very high, at -0.59 for Southeast Asia and 
-0.75 for South Asia. Moreover, that behavior is evident whether the NRA trend is 
upward or downward. A clear illustration of the latter point is provided by Malaysia, 
whose policy was reformed during its financial crisis years of 1985-87 when the 
growth in rice protection was reversed (figure 1.13).  
This begger-thy-neighbor dimension of each economy’s food policy reduces 
hugely the international public good role that trade between nations can play in 
bringing stability to the world’s food markets. The more some countries insulate their 
domestic markets, the more they export their volatility to the international market, and 
the greater the resulting volatility in that marketplace. This, in turn, creates a 
perceived need for other countries to do likewise. In most cases, volatility is exported 
through changes in import tariffs; but export taxes and export controls are sometimes 
also used by exporting countries. When NRAs in enough countries are adjusted in this 
way to changes in international prices, this exacerbates those change in world prices 
so that even larger changes in NRAs are desired—a classic collective action problem.  
A multilateral agreement to desist is thus needed. That is precisely what was 
sought during the GATT’s Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture via tariff 
bindings and disciplines on administered domestic prices. Tariff bindings can reduce 
the extent of the problem by restricting the range over which tariffs can increase in 
response to low prices. But to date the bindings are so far above applied import tariffs 
that this discipline on food-importing members in years of low international prices is 
very weak. Moreover, there is no corresponding GATT or WTO discipline on food 
export restrictions, which – as 2008 has starkly revealed – can be the problem in years 
of high international prices.     
  
Summary: What have we learned? 
 
One of the most salient features of price and trade policies in the Asian region since 
the 1960s is the spate of major economic reforms, including significant trade 
liberalization. Overall levels of non-agricultural protection have declined 
considerably, which has improved the competitiveness of the agricultural sector in 





been the gradual policy movement away from taxing agricultural exportables, and at 
the same time – and in contrast to non-agriculture – a rise in agricultural import 
protection.  
These features are captured in figure 1.14, which shows agriculture’s trade 
bias index on the horizontal axis and the RRA on the vertical axis. An economy with 
no anti-agricultural bias (RRA = 0) and no anti-trade bias within the farm sector (TBI 
= 0) would be located at the intersection of the two axes in figure 1.14. China and all 
the focus countries of South and Southeast Asia were to the southwest of that neutral 
point as of 1980-84, but by 2000-04 most had moved ot the right to become closer to 
the vertical axis (meaning they had reduced their anti-trade bias in agriculture). Most 
had shifted up to become also closer to the horizontal axis; but some are now above 
rather than below that axis, which means they are assisting farmers relative to 
producers of other tradable products – which can lead to just as much waste of 
resources as the earlier, anti-agricultural, policy bias.   
More specifically, the following features of the Asian experience of the past 
five decades are worth highlighting by way of summarizing the key findings of this 
regional study. 
Since the 1950s the region has seen a gradual movement away from taxing 
farmers relative to non-agricultural producers and the emergence during the most 
recent decade of positive assistance on average for Asian farmers. The gradual fall in 
the estimated (negative) RRA for the region, from more than -50 percent up to the 
early 1970s to small positive rates in the past decade, has been not dissimilar to but is 
more dramatic than the trends in Africa and Latin America. Instead of being 
efffectively taxed more than $130 billion per year as in the late 1970s/early 1980s (or 
$170 per person working in agriculture), Asian farmers in the region now enjoy 
support worth more than $60 billion per year or nearly $60 per person employed on 
farms.  
 The dispersion across Asian economies in nominal and relative rates of 
assistance to farmers has increased rather than diminished despite the reforms in the 
region. This result means there is still lots of scope for reducing distortions in the 
region’s use of resources in agriculture though more interantional re-location of 
production, especially in rice. That finding also suggests there are political economy 
forces at work in each country that do not change greatly relative to other countries 





agriculture and the RRA tend to rise with per capita income and to be higher the lower 
a country’s agricultural comparative advantage.  
The dispersion in nominal rates of assistance to farmers also has increased 
rather than diminished within each studied Asian economy. This result means there is 
still scope for reducing distortions in resource use within agriculture even in countries 
with an average NRA for agriculture and an RRA close to zero. As in other regions, 
the products in Asia with the highest rates of distortion and gross subsidy equivalent 
values are rice, sugar and milk. 
In particular, the strong anti-trade bias in assistance rates within the farm 
sector remains in place. The NRA for import-competing farm industries has increased 
over the decades studied, while the negative NRA for agricultural exportables has 
been phased down. The fact that the average NRAs for import-competing and 
exportable agricultural industries have risen almost in parallel means that the trade 
bias index has not fallen much from the high levels it rose to by the 1980s. This may 
be understandable from a political economy viewpoint, but it nonetheless means that 
resources are not allocated efficiently within the farm sector and – since openness 
tends to promote economic growth (Spence et al. 2008) – that total factor productivity 
growth in agriculture is slower than it would be if remaining interventions were 
removed. 
The most important instruments of farm assistance/taxation continue to be 
trade-restrictive measures. Domestic taxes and subsidies on farm inputs and outputs, 
and non-product-specific assistance, have made only minor contributions to the 
estimates of NRAs for Asia as a whole. True, input subsidies have played a significant 
role in India and, occasionally, in some other parts of the region. But, as in other 
regions such as Latin America (Lopez and Gallinato 2006), there has been 
comparatively little assistance provided via public investments in rural infrastructure 
and agricultural R&D
16 even though social rates of return from further such 
investments remain very high (Fan and Hazell 2001, Fan 2008) which suggests they 
could play a much bigger role in boosting farm output and productivity in the region. 
Movements in the consumer tax equivalent closely replicate changes in farm 
support/taxation, because agricultural taxation or assistance is mostly due to trade 
                                                 
16 Data in Pardey et al. (2006) suggest that public R&D expenditure in Asia since the late 1970s has 
averaged less than 0.5 percent of the gross value of production at undistorted prices, which is trivial 
compared with the NRA via price-distorting measures for Asia of 25 to 40 times that (12 percent in 





measures. This means that before the reforms food prices were kept artificially low 
but, in recent years, they have been above international levels on average in Asia. It 
also means there is considerable variation in consumer tax equivalents across products 
and across countries in the region. The current level of taxation of food consumers for 
the region as a whole is rising, and in 2000-04 it amounted to $11 per capita per year 
(compared with a subsidy of $22 in 1980-84).  
The decline in negative relative rates of assistance has been due as much to 
cuts in protection for non-agricultural sectors as to reforms of agricultural policies. 
This underscores the fact that the reductions in distortions to agricultural incentives in 
the region have been part of a series of economy-wide reform programs and not just 
due to farm policy reforms.   
  Food policies in continue to seek to reduce fluctuations in domestic food 
prices and in the quantities available for consumption via fluctuations in barriers to 
trade. This begger-thy-neighbor dimension of each economy’s food policy reduces 
hugely the international public good role that trade between nations can play in 
bringing stability to the world’s food markets. This is especially the case for rice, 
because it is the main staple in Asia and because Asia accounts for five-sixths of the 
global market for rice. 
 
 
Where to from here? 
 
 
The expectation is that, provided they remain open and continue to free up domestic 
markets and practice good macroeconomic governance, Asia’s developing economies 
will keep growing rapidly in the foreseeable future, and the growth there will be more 
rapid in manufacturing and service activities than in agriculture. In the more densely 
populated economies of the region that growth will be accompanied by rapid 
increases in per capita incomes of low-skilled workers where labor-intensive exports 
boom. Agricultural comparative advantage is thus likely to decline in such economies. 
Whether these economies become more dependent on imports of farm products 
depends, however, on what happens to the RRA. The first wave of Asian 
industrializers (Japan, and then Korea and Taiwan) chose to slow the growth of food 





down their NRA for non-farm tradables, such that their RRA became increasingly 
above the neutral zero level. A key question is: will later industrializers follow suit, 
given the past close association of RRAs with rising per capita income and falling 
agricultural comparative advantage? 
  When the RRAs for Japan, Korea and Taiwan are mapped against real per 
capita income, it is possible to superimpose on that same graph the RRAs for lower-
income economies to see how they are tracking relative to the first industrializers. 
Figure 1.15 does that for China and India, and shows that their RRA trends of the past 
three decades are on the same trajectory as the richer Northeast Asians. That provides 
reason to expect the governments of later industrializing economies to follow suit if 
other things were equal. 
One reason one might expect different government behavior now is because 
the earlier industrializers were not bound under GATT to keep down their agricultural 
protection. Had there been strict discipline on farm trade measures at the time Japan 
and Korea joined GATT in 1955 and 1967, respectively, their NRAs may have been 
halted at less than 20 percent (figure 1.16). At the time of China’s accession to WTO 
in December 2001, its NRA was less than 5 percent according to this present study, or 
7.3 percent for just import-competing agriculture. Its average bound import tariff 
commitment was about twice that (16 percent in 2005), but what matters most is 
China’s out-of-quota bindings on the items whose imports are restricted by tariff rate 
quotas. The latter tariff bindings as of 2005 were 65 percent for grains, 50 percent for 
sugar and 40 percent for cotton (WTO, ITC and UNCTAD 2007, p. 60). China also 
has bindings on farm product-specific domestic supports of 8.5 percent, and can 
provide another 8.5 percent as non-product specific assistance if it so wishes – a total 
17 percent NRA from domestic support measures alone, in addition to what is 
available through out-of-quota tariff protection.  
Clearly the legal commitments China made on acceding to WTO are a long 
way from current levels of domestic and border support for its farmers, and so are 
unlikely to constrain the government very much in the next decade or so;
17 and the 
legal constraints on Asia’s developing countries that joined the WTO earlier (except 
for Korea) are even less constraining. For India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, for 
example, their estimated NRAs for agricultural importables in 2000-04 are 34, 4 and 6 
                                                 





percent, respectively, whereas the average bound tariffs on their agricultural imports 
are 114, 96 and 189 percent, respectively (WTO, ITC and UNCTAD 2007). Also, like 
other developing countries, they have high bindings on product-specific domestic 
supports of 10 percent and another 10 percent for non-product specific assistance, a 
total of 20 more percentage points of NRA that legally could come from domestic 
support measures – compared with currently 10 percent in India and less than 3 
percent in the rest of South Asia (tables 1.13 an 1.14). 
One can only hope that the China and South and Southeast Asia will not make 
use of the legal wiggle room they have allowed themselves in their WTO bindings 
and thereby follow Japan, Korea and Taiwan into high agricultural protection.
18 A 
much more efficient and equitable strategy would be to instead treat agriculture in the 
same way they have been treating non-farm tradable sectors. That would involve 
opening the sector to international competition, and relying on more-efficient 
domestic taxes (e.g., income and consumption or value-added taxes) rather than trade 
taxes for raising government revenue.  
It might be argued that such a laissez faire strategy could increase rural-urban 
inequality and poverty and thereby generate social unrest. On the other hand, policies 
that lead to high prices for staple foods, in particular, involve potentially serious risks 
for the urban and rural poor who are net buyers of food in developing countries, as has 
been demonstrated by concerns about the recent increases in prices of these goods 
(Ivanic and Martin 2008). Available evidence suggests that problems of rural-urban 
poverty gaps have been alleviated in parts of Asia by some of the more-mobile 
members of farm households finding full- or part-time work off the farm and 
repatriating part of their higher earnings back to those remaining in farm households 
(Otsuka and Yamano 2006, World Bank 2007). Concerted government intervention 
through social policy measures are hugely important both in reducing the gaps 
between rural and urban incomes, identified by Hayami (2007) as a concern, and in 
raising national incomes overall (Winters, McCulloch and McKay 2004). Efficient 
ways of assisting any left-behind groups of poor (nonfarm as well as farm) households 
                                                 
18 The indications in the on-going Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO are not 
encouraging. The Group of 33 developing countries, led by Indonesia but strongly supported by India 
and the Philippines, among others, is arguing for additional ‘special and differential treatment’ for 
developing countries in the form of exemptions from agricultural tariff cuts for so-called ‘special 
products’, and for a special safeguard mechanism that would allow such countries to impose even 





include public investment measures that have high social payoffs such as in basic 
education and health and in rural infrastructure, as well as in agricultural research and 
development.
19  
What do the above lessons and implications suggest developing country 
policymakers should do when confronted, as in recent years, with a sharp upward 
movement in international food prices? In the past, as illustrated for rice in figures 
1.12 and 1.13, many governments have simply either increased their export 
restrictions or lowered their import restrictions on food staples for the duration of the 
spike. But what if this recent rise in international prices is much more prolonged than 
the short-lived spikes of recent decades? This year’s outlook projections by 
international agencies are suggesting prices could remain high for the foreseeable 
future, and that growth in net food imports by rapidly industrializing economies of 
Asia is one of the significant contributors.
20 Yet as we saw in figure 1.8 above, China 
and India over the past two or more decades have steadily raised their RRAs which 
had been sufficient to keep both countries very close to self sufficient in primary 
agricultural products over the previous four decades. In terms of all agricultural and 
processed food trade though, in 2000-04 China for the first time became a net 
importer while, in South Asia, India’s net exports were less than Pakistan and 
Bangladesh’s net imports for the first time since the latter 1960s (Sandri, Valenzuela 
and Anderson 2007).
21 Should these countries choose to keep their RRAs at current 
(close to zero) levels, their import dependence in agriculture could well increase over 
time. If so, other developing countries might well re-consider their current position in 
the WTO’s Doha round of trade negotiations: by agreeing to lower substantially their 
bound tariffs and subsidies on agricultural products, they could extract greater 
                                                 
19 As implied by the estimates reported in note 15 above, even if just one-twentieth of the current NRA 
provided to Asian farmers via farm price-support policies was replaced by agricultural R&D 
expenditure, that would more than double current public spending on such R&D – and the latter would 
increase regional economic welfare whereas price-distortionary policies reduce it. Such a boost to 
Asian R&D could well be able to generate another green revolution of the order of magnitude of the 
first one that began in the 1960s, especially if it took full advantage of the new developments in 
biotechnology (as shown for rice, for example, in Anderson, Jackson and Nielsen 2005).  
20 The World Bank’s commodity forecast as of May 2008 for grain prices is that by 2020 in real terms 
they will still be 10 percent above 2006 levels, which in turn were 20 percent above the average for 
2001-05. IFPRI (von Braun 2007) and the OECD and FAO (2008) similarly expect food prices to 
remain high well into next decade and beyond.  
21 This change for China was largely due to increases in imports of cotton needed to supply China’s 





‘concessions’ from high-income countries without having to reduce their actual 
applied rates for the foreseeable future. 
We have said little in this chapter about the effects of the NRA and RRA 
trends and fluctuations on economic welfare, price instability, income inequality or 
poverty, nor about their underlying causes. The analytical narratives in the chapters 
that follow touch to varying extents on those issues, but much more in-depth 
empirical analysis can now be undertaken with the help of these assistance estimates. 
Some will appear in the project’s forthcoming books. Specifically, Anderson, 
Valenzuela and van der Mensbrugghe (2009) provide results from a global economy-
wide model of the impacts on agricultural markets, national economic welfare and net 
farm incomes of distortions to the world’s goods markets as of 2004, using the new 
agricultural distortion estimates in this volume and its companion volumes for the 
other regions of the world. How those distortions – both own-country and rest-of 
world’s – impact on the extent of poverty and inequality are explored in a series of 
country case studies brought together in Anderson, Cockburn and Martin (2009), 
using national economy-wide models that are enhanced with detailed earning and 
spending information of numerous types of urban and rural households. And in 
Anderson (2009b) a broad range of theoretical and econometric analyses are brought 
together in an attempt to shed more light on the political economy forces that 
generated the evolving pattern of inter- and intra-sectoral distortions to farmer and 
food consumer incentives over the past half-century. But our hope is that the results 
from this study and its companion volumes will spawn many more such analyses in 
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Table 1.1: Key economic and trade indicators, Asian focus economies, 2000–04  





















 per capita 
RCA
a 
ag & food 
   1984  2004 
East Asia   29.09  8.38  24.76 47.1  29  45  75  -0.12  9  0.24 0.37 
China  20.60  4.33  16.62 38.4  21  54  58  -0.05  10  0.20 0.36 
Indonesia  3.41 0.59 2.62  3.8  17  27  173  0.08  4  0.30  0.35 
Korea, Rep.  0.77 1.62 1.69  0.2  212  5  26  -0.78  0  na  na 
Malaysia  0.39 0.28 0.73  0.1  74  41  107  -0.18  0  0.49  0.49 
Philippines  1.27 0.22 0.91  1.0  18  19  67  -0.10  13  0.41  0.44 
Taiwan  0.36 0.84 0.45  0.1  232  5  28  -0.72  0  na  na 
Thailand  1.01 0.38 1.05  1.5  38  39  204  0.38  1  0.45  0.42 
Vietnam  1.29 0.11 0.69  2.1  8  14  301  0.61  1  0.36  0.37 
South Asia 
21.67  1.99  11.90 25.3  9  20  145  0.07  31  0.31 0.35 
Bangladesh  2.16 0.14 0.90  2.9  7  8  93  -0.69  35  0.26  0.33 
India  16.87 1.57 9.32  20.2  9  22  143  0.24  36  0.31  0.33 
Pakistan  2.33 0.23 1.43  1.9  10  23  137  na  17  0.33  0.31 
Sri Lanka  0.31 0.05 0.24  0.3  16  15  254  0.45  6  0.32  0.40 
50.76 10.37 36.65  72.5  20  34  80  -0.15  19  0.27  0.36  Asian focus 
economies                   
a Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of 
global exports.  
b Primary agricultural trade specialization index is net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed food 
products (world average =0.0). 





d The poverty incidence and the 2004 Gini index are for the most recent year available between 2000 and 2004. The 1984 Gini coefficients are 
for the year nearest 1984, from the World Bank’s Povcal website. The weighted averages for the focus economies use population as the basis for 
weights. 





Table 1.2: Changes in poverty in Asia, 1981 to 2004 
 
 1981 1987 1993 1999  2004
No. of people (million):   
China 634 310 334 223  128
Other East Asia  162 119 86 53  41
  
India 364 369 376 376  371
Other South Asia  91 102 61 87  75
  
TOTAL, Asia  1251 900 857 740  615
  
% of population   
East Asia  58 28 25 15  9









Table 1.3: Growth of real GDP and exports, Asian focus economies, 1980 to 2004 
 
(at constant 2000 prices, percent per year, trend-based) 
 





East  Asia    3.1 9.0 7.9 7.6 6.3  13.7 
China  4.4 12.1 11.3  9.9  8.6 15.1 
Indonesia  2.9 6.6 5.3 5.4 3.7  10.4 
Korea,  Rep.  1.3 8.2 7.2 7.1 6.1  10.6 
Malaysia  1.7 7.8 6.9 6.6 3.9  10.3 
Philippines  1.7 2.0 3.5 2.7 0.4  12.8 
Taiwan  0.5 5.3 8.3 6.7 5.6  17.0 
Thailand  2.4 8.5 5.8 6.3 4.9  17.3 
Vietnam  3.9 9.7 7.5 7.0 5.1  n.a. 
South  Asia  3.0 6.2 6.4 5.4 3.4 n.a. 
Bangladesh  2.7 6.6 4.4 4.4 2.1  13.4 
India  3.0 6.3 7.0 5.7 3.7 n.a. 
Pakistan  4.0 5.5 4.8 4.7 2.1 9.8 
Sri  Lanka  1.8 5.6 5.1 4.5 3.3 6.3 
Asian focus 
economies 
3.1 8.6 7.5 7.1 5.5  n.a. 
WORLD  2.0 2.5 3.2 3.0 1.4  n.a. 
 
a 1985-95, from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008, Table 6.2. 
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled from World Bank’s 





Table 1.4: Exports of goods and services as a share of GDP, Asian focus economies, 





b  1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
East Asia
a 8  19 22 25 28 34  39
China 3  6 11 14 22 21  28
Indonesia 10  23 25 23 26 32  35
Korea, Rep.  13  32 34 35 27 33  39
Malaysia 37  49 53 63 82 103  117
Philippines 11  20 21 25 28 47  53
Taiwan 22  49 53 54 45 48  59
Thailand 18  21 23 30 38 49  68
Vietnam na  na   na na na  44  55
South Asia   na  7 7 7 11 12  14
Bangladesh na 5 5 6 8 13  15
India 3  6 6 6 9 11  13
Pakistan na  12 12 14 17 16  16
Sri Lanka   





na 16 19 22 25 30 34
 
a Ignores Vietnam in the period 1980 to 1994, whose weight in Asian GDP was less 
than 1 percent.  
 
b For 1965-69, merchandise exports only except for Taiwan. In 1960-64, Korea and 
Taiwan’s shares were 6 and 15 percent respectively, and in 1955-59 Taiwan’s share 
was 10 percent. 
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled from World Bank’s 





Table 1.5: Share of world exports of non-food manufactures, Asian focus economies, 




 1990-94  1995-99 2000-04 2006 Current 
value in 
2006 as % 
of 1990 
East Asia  5.1  10.3 15.6 20.4 790 
China 1.0  2.4 6.1 10.8 2020 
Indonesia 0.1  0.5 0.6 0.5 490 
Korea, Rep.  1.7  2.6 3.1 3.5 480 
Malaysia 0.2  1.0 1.5 1.4 750 
Philippines 0.1  0.2 0.6 0.5 730 
Taiwan 1.8  2.7 2.5 2.3 310 
Thailand 0.2  0.8 1.0 1.2 670 
Vietnam 0.0  0.1 0.2 0.2 na 
South Asia   0.6  0.9 1.1 1.4 470 
Bangladesh 0.0  0.1 0.1 0.1 800 
India 0.4  0.5 0.7 1.0 550 
Pakistan 0.1  0.2 0.2 0.2 310 
Sri Lanka  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 480 
Asian focus 
economies





Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled from World Bank’s 







































34 26 19 10 29 40 40 42 34 32 41 48
China  39 31 27 14 35 47 44 46 26 22 30 41
Indonesia  49 29 23 16 16 35 36 45 35 36 41 40
Korea, Rep.  30 21 10 4 22 30 37 35 48 49 53 61
Malaysia  29 26 20 9 27 37 39 49 44 37 42 42
Philippines  27 29 24 14 27 36 35 32 46 35 42 53
Taiwan  20 10  5 2 34 44 45 31 47 46 50 67
Thailand  30 25 16 10 24 29 34 43 46 46 50 48
Vietnam  na na 41 23 na na 27 39 na na 32 38
South Asia   43 36 29 21 18 21 23 24 39 42 48 55
Bangladesh  54 55 31 22 9 14 21 25 36 31 48 52
India  44 36 29 21 19 22 24 24 38 43 47 55
Pakistan  35 29 24 22 19 21 21 22 46 50 55 56
Sri Lanka 
29 28 24 17 21 26 24 24 51 46 51 59
Asian focus 
economies
a  36 28 22 12 27 36 35 38 35 34 43 49
 
a Ignores Vietnam in the periods 1965-69 and 1975-79, whose weight in Asian GDP 
was less than 1 percent.  
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled from World Bank’s 











  1965–69 1975–79 1985–89 2000–04 
East Asia   77 72 68 60 
China 79 75 73 66 
Indonesia 69 60 56 47 
Korea, Rep.  53 41 24 9 
Malaysia 57 45 31 18 
Philippines 60 54 48 39 
Taiwan 45 25 15 7 
Thailand 81 74 66 55 
Vietnam 79 74 72 67 
South Asia   74 70 65 57 
Bangladesh 85 76 67 54 
India 73 70 66 59 
Pakistan 65 64 55 46 
Sri Lanka  55 53 49 45 
Asian focus 
economies 
76 71 67 59 
 











 Agriculture  and  processed 
food 

























East  Asia    46 30 18  7 10 16 12  7 43 53 62 85 
China  51 35 19  5  5 17 14  4 44 48 53 90 
Indonesia  49 26 21 15 48 72 55 29  2  2 24 55 
Korea,  Rep.  21  11 5 2 9 2 2 6  70  87  92  92 
Malaysia  61 55 36 10 32 27 24 11  5 17 40 78 
Philippines  78 55 27  6 16 17 11  3  7 18 32 83 
Taiwan  39  13 6 3 2 2 2 3  59  85  92  94 
Thailand  79 67 46 18 14 10  3  4  4 20 50 75 
Vietnam  na na na 27 na na na 23 na na na 48 
South  Asia    42 40 26 13  9  8  7  8 49 52 66 78 
Bangladesh  na 37 28  8 na  1  1  0 na 61 71 91 
India  38 35 22 13 11  9  9 11 50 55 67 75 
Pakistan  53 38 30 12  2  5  1  2 45 57 68 85 
Sri Lanka  96  79  47  23 2 8 5 2 1 9  46  75 
 
Asian focus 
economies  45 32 18  7 10 14 12  7 44 53 62 85 
 
a Ignores Vietnam in the period 1985-89, whose weight in Asian merchandise trade 
was less than 1 percent.  
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled from World Bank’s 







Table 1.9: Indexes of comparative advantage in agriculture and processed food,
a 
Asian focus economies, 1965 to 2004 
(a) Revealed comparative advantage index,
a world = 1.0 
 1965–69 1975–79 1985–89  2000–04
East Asia   2.2 2.2 1.1  0.7
China 2.1 2.1 1.3  0.6
Indonesia 2.0 1.3 1.4  1.7
Korea, Rep.  0.8 0.6 0.3  0.3
Malaysia 2.4 2.9 2.4  1.1
Philippines 3.1 2.8 1.9  0.7
Taiwan 1.5 0.6 0.4  0.3
Thailand 3.1 3.5 3.1  2.0
Vietnam na na na  3.0
South Asia   1.9 2.0 1.8  1.4
Bangladesh na 1.9 1.9  0.9
India 1.5 1.8 1.5  1.4
Pakistan 2.1 1.9 2.1  1.4
Sri Lanka  3.8 4.1 3.2  2.5
Asian focus 
economies 2.2 2.2 1.2  0.8
 
(b) Trade specialization index,
b world = 0.0 
 
 1965–69 1975–79 1985–89  2000–04
East Asia   na na na  -0.03
China na na 0.07  -0.16
Indonesia 0.48 0.42 0.43  0.16
Korea, Rep.  -0.63 -0.41 -0.45  -0.53
Malaysia 0.44 0.60 0.56  0.29
Philippines 0.47 0.51 0.25  -0.18
Taiwan 0.08 -0.27  -0.35
Thailand 0.68 0.69 0.57  0.44
Vietnam   na na  na   0.44
South Asia   na 0.05 0.03  -0.06
Bangladesh na -0.37 -0.46  -0.62
India -0.18 0.13 0.16  0.10
Pakistan 0.20 -0.13 -0.05  -0.24
Sri Lanka  0.34 0.30 0.21  0.08
Asian focus 
economies na na na  -0.03
a Share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio of that sector’s 
share of global merchandise exports. 
b Net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and 
processed food products. 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled from World Bank’s 





Table 1.10: Export orientation, import dependence and self-sufficiency in primary 
agricultural production, Asian focus economies, 1961 to 2004  
 
(percent at undistorted prices) 
(a) Exports as share of production 
 
  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Korea  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Taiwan  5  9 13 14 10 10 6  5  6
China  2 2 2 3 5 5 7 7 7
Indonesia  - - 6 5 5 6 4 5 4
Malaysia  70 64 54 41 35 34 19 12  9
Philippines 13  11  14 8 7 2 1 1 1
Thailand  -  - 13 20 24 26 25 25 30
Vietnam -  -  - - - 3 4  9  11
Bangladesh -  -  - 3 3 3 2  1  1
India  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Pakistan  7 5 5 2 5 8 4 2 1
Sri  Lanka  68 62 44 52 36 34 24 31 39
Asian focus 
economies
c  3 4 4 4 4 6 6 5 5
 
(b) Imports as share of apparent consumption 
 
  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Korea  4  5 12 8 11  9 11 11 13
Taiwan  24 33 56 66 76 81 86 90 93
China  2 2 2 3 5 5 7 7 7
Indonesia  - - 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
Malaysia  13 6 3 1 1 1 2 3 6
Philippines  0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1
T h a i l a n d   -  -  00000  2  5
Vietnam -  -  - - - 0 0  0  0
Bangladesh -  -  - 3 4 5 3  3  5
India  3 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
Pakistan  6 5 3 5 2 5 5 6 4
Sri  Lanka  7 5 1 0 1 4 1 3 5
Asian focus 
economies






Table 1.10 (continued): Export orientation, import dependence and self-sufficiency in 
primary agricultural production, Asian focus economies, 1961 to 2004  
 
 
(c) Self-sufficiency ratio 
 
  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Korea  96 95 88 92 89 91 90 91 87
Taiwan  80 73 51 40 27 21 15 11  7
China  99 101 100 99 98 101 101  99  98
Indonesia  -  - 106 105 104 106 104 103 102
Malaysia  293 265 215 167 152 150 122 110 104
Philippines  115 112 116 108 106 101 101  99  99
Thailand  -  - 115 125 131 135 133 130 137
Vietnam -  -  - - - 103 104  110  112
Bangladesh  -  - 98 99 99 98 99 98 96
India  98 97 99 99 99 99 100  100  100
Pakistan  101 100 102 97 103 104 99  96  97
Sri  Lanka  297 298 194 221 155 144 131 142 157
Asian focus 
economies
c  100  100  100 99 97 94 88 87 85
 
Source: Compiled using the project’s estimates of total agricultural production (both covered and non-
covered products) valued at undistorted prices, plus the FAO’s total agricultural trade value data, with 








Table 1.11: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,
a Asian focus economies, 1955 to 2004
c 
(percent)  
   1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Northeast Asia  -42.8 -42.6 -41.7 -41.2 -39.5 -38.2 -25.7  -1.7  14.4  11.9 
Korea  -3.2  4.0 13.4 35.7 56.3 89.4  126.1  152.8  129.8  137.3 
Taiwan 
c  -12.0  3.6  3.0  9.3  7.1 14.9 27.1 38.1 46.4 61.3 
China
 d  -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -35.5 -14.3  6.6  5.9 
Southeast  Asia  na -6.8  5.9 -8.8  0.0  4.6 -0.4 -4.2  0.0 11.1 
Indonesia  na  na  na -2.6  9.3  9.2 -1.7 -6.6 -8.6 12.0 
Malaysia  na -7.2 -7.5 -9.0  -13.0 -4.6  1.3  2.3 -0.2  1.2 
Philippines  na -5.3 14.4 -5.1 -7.1 -1.0 18.7 18.5 32.9 22.0 
Thailand  na  na  na  -20.3  -14.0 -2.0 -6.2 -5.7  1.7 -0.2 
Vietnam
c  na na na na na na  -13.9  -25.4  0.6  21.2 
South  Asia  0.0  -0.5 0.6 0.4  -5.5 0.6  20.9 0.7 0.2  13.6 
Bangladesh  na  na  na  -16.0  1.4 -3.3 11.7 -1.5 -5.2  2.7 
India 
d  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2  -5.6 1.9  24.9 1.8 0.7  15.8 
Pakistan 
c  na -0.7 15.3  6.8 -8.5 -6.4 -4.0 -6.9 -1.6  1.2 
Sri  Lanka  -2.3 -22.8 -24.5 -16.3 -25.5 -13.5  -9.9  -1.2  12.2  9.5 
Asian focus economies: 
Unweighted 
average
b  -12.3  -10.2 -3.9 -4.7 -4.1  3.2 11.5 12.1 16.8 21.7 
Weighted. 
average




e  25.3 25.2 31.2 29.9 32.5 39.9 43.8 47.5 36.6 38.0 
Product 
coverage 
f  52 65 63 64 68 74 78 75 73 66 
 
a Weighted average for each country, including product-specific input distortions and non-
product specific assistance as well as authors’ guesstimates for non-covered farm products, 
with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices. 
b The unweighted average is the simple average across the twelve economies of their national 
NRA (weighted) averages.  
c Pakistan data for 1960-64 is 1961-64; Vietnam data for 1985-89 is 1986-1989; Taiwan data 
for 2000-04 is 2000-03.  
d Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the 
nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the average NRA 
estimates for those economies for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value 
of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of 
production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. This NRA 
assumption is conservative in the sense that for both countries the average NRA was probably 
even lower in earlier years. 
e Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of 
the national agricultural sector NRAs each year. 
f Weighted average share of gross value of total agricultural production at undistorted prices 
accounted for by covered products. 
 






Table 1.12: Dispersion of nominal rates of assistance across covered agricultural products,
a 




   1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Northeast Asia
c  38.5 38.5 66.8 61.7 68.6 64.0 67.1 80.5  102.3  116.6 
Korea  34.1 40.5 85.0 82.5 89.0 80.1  114.8  164.2  200.1  225.4 
Taiwan 
b  42.8 36.4 48.7 40.9 48.2 37.5 34.3 56.5 88.4  109.0 
China
   na  na  na  na  na 74.3 52.3 20.7 18.4 15.3 
Southeast Asia
c  na 21.1 30.4 23.9 32.7 46.2 47.9 42.5 39.7 40.4 
Indonesia  na  na  na 29.1 49.4 53.6 35.0 40.5 49.0 33.3 
Malaysia  na 19.8 10.6 11.0 34.8 58.6 90.5 71.9 33.7 40.1 
Philippines  na 22.5 50.2 28.3 24.2 42.7 50.9 30.1 40.6 37.6 
Thailand  na  na  na 27.5 22.4 30.1 29.3 25.1 22.9 16.7 
Vietnam
b  na na na na na na  33.6  44.7  52.4  74.3 
South Asia
c  44.2 46.3 64.9 51.8 55.2 51.5 86.2 55.4 45.0 58.7 
Bangladesh  na  na  na  na 71.4 67.6  190.7 77.5 67.9  101.2 
India    na 35.5 68.0 45.8 49.8 39.2 46.9 28.5 19.4 21.5 
Pakistan 
b  na 74.6  105.8 77.6 45.0 52.2 69.4 34.4 29.4 43.1 
Sri  Lanka  44.2 28.7 20.9 31.9 54.6 46.9 37.9 81.3 63.3 69.1 
Asian focus economies: 
Unweighted 
average
c  39.0 36.8 55.5 41.5 48.0 51.1 66.9 55.9 55.6 64.4 
 
a Dispersion for each country is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation 
around a weighted mean of NRAs across covered products each year. 
b Pakistan data for 1960-64 is 1961-64; Vietnam data for 1985-89 is 1986-1989; Taiwan data 
for 2000-04 is 2000-03.  
c The unweighted average is the simple average across the relevant economies of their 5-year 
simple average dispersion measures. 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from estimates reported in Chapters 2-12 of 





Table 1.13: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural exportables, import-competing 
products, and the trade bias index,
a Asian focus economies, 1955 to 2004      
 (percent) 
 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
        K o r e a             
NRA agric. exp  na na na na na na na na na na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  -3.3  4.9 16.3 46.1 71.8  118.6 159.8 197.6 164.8 171.9 
Trade Bias Index  0.03 -0.05 -0.14 -0.32 -0.42 -0.54 -0.62 -0.66 -0.62 -0.63 
Exportables’ share
b  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    Taiwan
  
c             
NRA agric. exp  -18.1 5.7 4.3  15.4  10.3  25.1 48.9 57.1 57.0 70.3 
NRA agric. imp-comp  -3.6 0.5 2.3 3.3 5.2 9.2 18.1 42.0 54.3 71.3 
Trade Bias Index  -0.15 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.15 0.27 0.11 0.02 0.00 
Exportables’ share
b  85 80 78 74 70 61 47 28 25 24 
    China
             
NRA agric. exp  na na na na na  -56.9  -46.0  -21.8  -0.8  -0.1 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na na na na na  -11.0  20.4 2.2  17.0 7.3 
Trade Bias Index  na na na na na  -0.50  -0.55 -0.23 -0.15 -0.07 
Exportables’ share
b  na na na na na 79 88 80 75 72 
   Northeast Asia             
NRA agric. exp  -18.1 5.7 4.3  15.4  10.3  -40.0 -44.2 -20.5  -0.2  0.2 
NRA agric. imp-comp  -3.4  3.9 14.4 38.3 59.7 21.2 51.8 42.8 40.5 26.4 
Trade Bias Index  -0.15  0.02 -0.09 -0.17 -0.31 -0.50 -0.63 -0.44 -0.29 -0.21 
Exportables’ share
b  35 31 32 29 29 76 83 74 70 69 
             
    Indonesia              
NRA agric. exp  na  na  na -3.3 -0.3 -7.0  -16.5  -24.6  -17.2 -3.3 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  na  na -1.3 16.5 19.5  5.1 -0.7 -5.8 24.7 
Trade Bias Index  na na na  0.01  -0.14  -0.21 -0.20 -0.24 -0.12 -0.22 
Exportables’ share
b  na na na 57 37 34 32 29 34 37 
     Malaysia              
NRA agric. exp  na  -11.4 -9.0  -12.7  -18.7  -11.8 -5.0 -4.1 -3.0 -1.3 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na 13.0 -1.8  2.5 21.6 36.7 44.1 33.2 10.8 12.3 
Trade Bias Index  na -0.22 -0.06 -0.14 -0.31 -0.35 -0.33 -0.28 -0.12 -0.12 
Exportables’ share
b  na 84 79 78 86 86 86 82 80 81 
     Philippines              
NRA agric. exp  na -6.2 35.4  -10.2 -9.9 -3.8  6.2  4.8 -0.7 -3.7 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na -5.3 10.1 -2.7 -6.1  0.6 30.0 27.6 47.9 30.8 
Trade Bias Index  na 0.00 0.23  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04 -0.18 -0.17 -0.32 -0.25 
Exportables’ share
b  na 21 22 30 41 41 39 33 25 22 
     Thailand             
NRA agric. exp  na  na  na -26.7 -19.4 -11.1 -11.7  -9.2  -3.8  -0.6 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na na na  -4.8  1.9  45.3  22.0 6.4  34.4 4.7 
Trade Bias Index  na na na  -0.18  -0.20  -0.37 -0.24 -0.14 -0.27 -0.03 
Exportables’ share
b  na na na 83 83 84 84 81 85 86 
     Vietnam 
c             
NRA agric. exp  na na na na na na  -17.5  -27.1  -2.0  17.7 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na na na na na na 37.1 25.8 65.4 67.3 
Trade Bias Index  na na na na na na  -0.37 -0.42 -0.40 -0.29 
Exportables’ share
b  na na na na na na 98 96 96 94 
    Southeast Asia            
NRA agric. exp  na -10.8  4.4 -13.9 -10.8  -8.7 -11.0 -14.9  -7.6  1.0 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na 4.5 8.2  -2.7  11.1  18.4 10.6  5.8  8.0 24.9 
Trade Bias Index  na -0.15 -0.03 -0.12 -0.20 -0.23 -0.19 -0.20 -0.14 -0.19 
Exportables’ share






Table 1.13 (continued) 
 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
     Bangladesh             
NRA agric. exp  na na na na  -34.6  -26.2 -32.4 -33.0  -9.9 -33.2 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na na na na  6.5  -1.9  24.4  -0.1  -7.9  6.0 
Trade Bias Index  na na na na  -0.30  -0.23 -0.45 -0.33  0.00 -0.37 
Exportables’ share
b  na  na  na  na  13 9 7  11 7 5 
     India             
NRA agric. exp  na  na -37.4 -22.3 -35.9 -27.8  -6.0 -15.3 -12.4  -6.4 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  na 41.7 52.7 74.5 58.8 81.4 38.3 22.5 34.2 
Trade Bias Index  na  na -0.55 -0.50 -0.63 -0.54 -0.47 -0.38 -0.28 -0.30 
Exportables’ share
b  na na 58 74 73 63 43 70 71 51 
      Pakistan 
c             
NRA agric. exp  na -33.3 -35.3 -20.1 -33.5 -29.1  -32.1  -16.7 -4.4 -5.6 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na 1.8  45.0  19.2  -4.3  -1.9 5.4  -7.9  -1.9 3.7 
Trade Bias Index  na -0.38 -0.55 -0.27 -0.31 -0.28 -0.35 -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 
Exportables’ share
b  na 31 29 24 25 27 30 24 21 22 
       Sri Lanka             
NRA agric. exp  -22.8 -40.0 -38.6 -41.1 -45.2 -31.1 -21.4 -24.2  -2.0  5.9 
NRA agric. imp-comp  62.5 11.9 -5.9  9.0 -3.7 -0.6 -2.1 22.4 31.8 12.8 
Trade Bias Index  -0.52 -0.45 -0.35 -0.45 -0.43 -0.31 -0.18 -0.38 -0.25 -0.05 
Exportables’ share
b  76 72 68 50 62 58 52 51 58 58 
    South Asia            
NRA agric. exp  -22.8 -37.7 -37.2 -30.0 -36.1 -27.9 -20.6 -15.8 -12.0  -6.2 
NRA agric. imp-comp  62.5 24.7 41.2 39.4 45.1 37.9 63.3 25.1 14.5 26.5 
Trade Bias Index  -0.52 -0.50 -0.56 -0.50 -0.56 -0.48 -0.51 -0.33 -0.23 -0.26 
Exportables’ share
b  76 27 53 61 63 56 32 63 64 46 
 
a Trade Bias Index, TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagx and 
NRAagm are the average percentage NRAs for the exportable and import-competing parts of 
the agricultural sector. 
b Export share is the exportables’ share of the gross value of production at undistorted prices 
of all agricultural tradables, with weighted averages shown for sub-regions. 
c Pakistan data for 1960-64 is 1961-64; Vietnam data for 1985-89 is 1986-89; Taiwan data for 
2000-04 is 2000-03.  
d Regional averages of the trade bias index are calculated from the regional averages of the 
NRAs for exportable and import-competing parts of the agricultural sector.   
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA estimates reported in Chapters 2-
12 of this book. 
     All Asian focus economies (unweighted average)
d  
NRA agric. exp  -20.4 -16.3 -12.5 -15.5 -20.8 -17.3 -12.5 -10.4  0.1  0.9 
NRA agric. imp-comp  18.9 6.8  15.2  13.2  17.7  24.6 36.4 31.4 34.5 34.5 
Trade Bias Index
   -0.33 -0.22 -0.24 -0.25 -0.33 -0.34 -0.36 -0.32 -0.26 -0.25 
     All Asian focus economies (weighted average)
d  
NRA agric. exp  -20.2 -12.6 -27.2 -20.7 -25.4 -41.7 -38.1 -19.1  -4.3  -0.6 
NRA agric. imp-comp  5.9 4.7  33.9  26.6  31.3  20.8 43.8 25.8 24.8 25.4 
Trade Bias Index   -0.25 -0.17 -0.46 -0.37 -0.43 -0.52 -0.57 -0.36 -0.23 -0.21 
Exportables’ share





Table 1.14: Nominal rates of assistance for covered farm products, by policy instrument, 
Asian focus economies, 1965 to 2004  
(percent) 
    1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
        K o r e a             
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, domestic MS
c  -0.2  -0.4 0.9 4.2 7.1 5.3 5.5 5.9 6.1 5.2 
NRA, border MS
c  -3.7  4.7 15.7 43.4 66.7 117.5 161.2 196.0 176.9 208.5 
NRA, agric. total  -3.9  4.4  16.6  47.6  73.8 122.8 166.7 201.9 182.9 213.6 
    Taiwan            
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, domestic MS
c  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, border MS
c  -23.6 7.3 6.3  20.4  14.4  36.9  82.4 117.4 142.2 178.4 
NRA, agric. total  -23.6  7.3  6.3 20.4 14.4 36.9 82.4  117.4  142.2  178.4 
    China            
NRA, agric. inputs  na  na  na  na  na 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.5 
NRA, domestic MS
c  na na na na na  -12.6  -6.3  -6.2  -1.1  -1.4 
NRA, border MS
c  na na na na na  -38.5 -34.6 -12.9  2.7  1.8 
NRA,  agric.  total  na na na na  na -50.8 -40.6 -18.9  2.3  0.9 
    Northeast Asia              
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.5 
NRA, domestic MS
c  -0.1 -0.2  0.6  2.6  4.6 -8.4 -5.8 -5.5 -0.8 -1.2 
NRA, border MS
c  -12.1  5.7 12.3 34.9 48.3  -11.4 -26.6  -1.5  10.9  9.0 
NRA, agric. total  -12.3  5.5  12.9  37.5  53.0 -19.6 -32.2  -6.8  10.7  8.3 
    Indonesia            
NRA, agric. inputs  na  na  na 6.0 6.8 7.3 6.0 3.2 2.6 2.3 
NRA, domestic MS
c  na na na  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, border MS
c  na  na  na -8.7  4.3  4.8 -6.3 -8.8  -11.7 13.3 
NRA, agric. total  na  na  na  -2.7 11.1 12.2 -0.3 -5.5 -9.1 15.6 
    Malaysia            
NRA, agric. inputs  na  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, domestic MS
c  na -9.0 -8.1  -10.2  -17.0 -6.9  0.4  2.5 -0.1  1.5 
NRA, border MS
c  na 0.6  -0.6  -0.3 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.0  -0.3 0.6 
NRA, agric. total  na  -8.4  -8.7  -10.5  -15.3  -5.7 1.8 3.4  -0.3 2.1 
    Philippines            
NRA, agric. inputs  na  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, domestic MS
c  na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, border MS
c  na -6.7 16.7 -6.0 -8.7 -1.6 21.9 21.4 37.8 24.9 
NRA, agric. total  na  -6.7  16.7  -6.0 -8.7 -1.6 21.9 21.4 37.8 24.9 
    Thailand            
NRA, agric. inputs  na  na  na  -1.3 -1.2 -1.1 -2.7 -1.8 -1.4 -0.8 
NRA, domestic MS
c  na na na  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, border MS
c  na  na  na  -24.5  -17.2 -7.3 -7.0 -5.9  0.3  0.2 
NRA, agric. total  na  na  na  -25.8  -18.4 -8.4 -9.7 -7.7 -1.1 -0.6 
    Vietnam            
NRA, agric. inputs  na  na  na  na  na  na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, domestic MS
c  na na na na na na  -0.7  -0.9  0.0  1.7 
NRA, border MS
c  na na na na na na -12.6 -24.6  0.6  19.0 
NRA, agric. total  na  na  na  na na na  -13.3  -25.4  0.7  20.6 
   Southeast Asia            
NRA, agric. inputs  na  0.0  0.0 2.1 3.5 4.0 2.7 1.3 1.0 0.9 
NRA, domestic MS
c  na -6.3 -3.3 -1.4 -2.1 -0.9  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.4 
NRA, border MS
c  na -1.8  9.6  -11.2 -2.1  1.5 -2.2 -4.5 -0.1 11.9 





Table 1.14 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance for covered farm products, by policy 
instrument, Asian focus economies, 1965 to 2004  
(percent) 
    1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
    Bangladesh            
NRA, agric. inputs  na  na  na  na 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.5 2.2 2.6 
NRA, domestic MS
c  na na na na  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, border MS
c  na na na na  1.7  -4.9  15.5  -3.7  -9.8  1.3 
NRA,  agric.  total  na na na na  2.8 -3.8 16.8 -2.2 -7.6  3.9 
    India            
NRA, agric. inputs  na  na  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 4.4 5.7 7.2 9.5 
NRA, domestic MS
c  na  na 18.1 17.8  3.7  2.1 4.3 3.4  -0.1 0.2 
NRA, border MS
c  na  na  -17.9  -17.7 -9.3 -0.8 16.2 -7.3 -6.4  6.1 
NRA, agric. total  na  na  0.3  0.2  -5.6 1.9  24.9 1.8 0.7  15.8 
    Pakistan            
NRA, agric. inputs  na  -4.5  -2.1  -1.6 4.6 3.5 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.4 
NRA, domestic MS
c  na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, border MS
c  na  -1.3  23.9  10.9 -16.4 -12.8  -8.8 -12.5  -4.5  0.1 
NRA, agric. total  na  -5.8  21.7  9.3  -11.8 -9.3 -5.9  -10.2 -2.6  1.5 
    SriLanka            
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, domestic MS
c  4.2 8.1 6.9 5.0 5.1 5.0 3.6 1.5 0.7 0.9 
NRA, border MS
c  -14.5 -38.0 -36.9 -25.4 -37.0 -24.2 -16.3  -3.1  10.8  7.8 
NRA, agric. total  -10.3  -29.9  -30.0  -20.3 -31.9 -19.2 -12.6  -1.7  11.5  8.6 
    South Asia            
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0  -1.5  -0.2  -0.1 0.4 0.9 4.0 5.0 6.3 8.3 
NRA, domestic MS
c  4.2  8.3 16.3 16.1  3.1  1.8 3.6 2.8  -0.1 0.2 
NRA, border MS
c  -14.5  -14.7  -14.9  -15.4 -9.2 -2.5 13.5 -7.5 -6.2  5.2 
NRA, agric. total  -10.3  -7.8  1.2 0.6  -5.7 0.2  21.0 0.3 0.0  13.6 
    Asian focus economies  (unweighted average)  
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0  -0.6  -0.3 0.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.3 
NRA, domestic MS
c  1.4 0.6 2.4 1.4  -0.8  -0.9 0.1 0.0  -0.1 0.2 
NRA, border MS
c  -13.4 -6.1  1.1 -0.9  0.3  6.5 17.7 20.8 26.2 30.9 
NRA, agric. total  -12.0  -6.2  3.2 0.9 0.6 6.6  18.8 21.7 27.3 32.4 
    Asian focus economies  (weighted average)
d  
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0  -0.5  -0.1 0.4 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.3 2.6 
NRA, domestic MS
c  1.4  2.0 13.0 10.6  1.0 -5.3 -2.9 -2.5 -0.6 -0.7 
NRA, border MS
c  -12.4  -4.2 -10.2 -10.8  -2.8 -17.4 -13.7  -4.0  4.3  8.2 
NRA, agric. total  -11.1  -2.7  2.6  0.3  -0.4 -21.6 -15.2  -4.8  6.0  10.2 
 
a Weights for the sub-regional and regional averages are based on the gross value of 
agricultural production at undistorted prices. 
b Pakistan data for 1960-64 is 1961-64; Vietnam data for 1985-89 is 1986-1989; Taiwan data 
for 2000-04 is 2000-03. 
c MS = market support, either via domestic subsidies (or taxes if negative) or via a measure at 
the border such as an import tariff or export subsidy (or, if negative, an import subsidy or 
export tax) 
d Weighted by the gross value of production of covered products at undistorted prices.   
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA estimates reported in Chapters 2-





Table 1.15: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total and per farm worker, 
Asian economies,
a 1955 to 2004 
 
(a) Total (constant 2000 US$ million using the US GDP deflator) 
    1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79  1980-84 
1985-
89  1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Korea  -154  107  854  1672  6943  9335  13306 18594 17536 15289 
Taiwan  -394 133 132 439 605 1342  2500  3849  4170  3725 
China  -52857 -69648 -70671 -98931 -124086 -118224  -75780  -28381 15667 15644 
Indonesia  na na na  -848  3783  4131  -785  -2729  -4101  4286 
Malaysia  na -250 -246 -547  -1097  -456  75  156  3  100 
Philippines  na -225  735  -1082  -903  -299  1399 1850 3832 1951 
Thailand  na na na  -2434  -2148  -324  -645  -719  260  -14 
Vietnam  na na na na na  na  -726  -1815  -18  1602 
Bangladesh  na na na na  583  -672  882  -103  -448  189 
India  46 61  -993  -7803  -8653 -49  21607  1600  281  15433 
Pakistan  na -91  1089 -34  -815 -787  -380  -755  -260  95 
Sri Lanka  -68 -461 -455 -396 -571  -344  -194  -27  245  154 
Asian focus 
economies   -53426 -70373 -69554 -109965 -126359 -106348  -38740  -8481 37169 58455 
All Asian 
economies




(b) Per person engaged in agriculture (constant 2000 US$ using the US GDP deflator)
a 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Korea  20  155  293 1196 1716 3041 5618 6445 6899 
Taiwan  76  76  261  390 1045 2077 3699 4795 5329 
China
c  -235 -222 -281 -319 -280 -163  -57  31  31 
Indonesia  na  na -27 113 113 -19 -60 -86  86 
Malaysia  -135 -126 -267 -515 -213  36  79  2  56 
Philippines  -33  99  -132 -99 -30 132 163 318 155 
Thailand  na  na  -163  -130 -18 -34 -36  13  -1 
Vietnam  na na na na na  -33  -73 -1 57 
Bangladesh  na  na  na  20 -22  26  -3 -12  5 
India
c  0  -6  -43  -43 0  97 7 1  57 
Pakistan  -7  78  -2 -47 -41 -19 -35 -11  4 
Sri  Lanka  -217 -195 -155 -207 -116  -60  -8  66  40 
Asian focus 
economies    -125 -115 -166 -174 -136  -46  -9  40  61 
All Asian 
economies







Table 1.15 (continued): Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total and per farm 
worker, Asian economies,
a 1955 to 2004  
 
(c) by sub-sector (at undistorted farmgate prices, constant US$ billions) 
Focus economies 
Total GSE for all Asian economies 





















c  TOTAL Exportables 
Import-
competing 
1955-59  -0.7 0.1 0.4  -56.6  -56.8  -58.6  10.1 
1960-64  0.8 -0.1 -1.0  -74.4  -74.7  -74.4  12.0 
1965-69  1.4 -0.3 -0.8  -74.4  -74.0  -78.6  14.8 
1970-74  -7.7  -3.7  0.3 -106.3  -117.4 -113.9  11.1 
1975-79  -0.9 -1.4 -0.7  -131.4  -134.4  -142.9  26.5 
1980-84 -76.4 -6.2 14.0  -44.6  -113.1  -140.3  26.6 
1985-89  -50.0  6.2  15.4 -12.8  -41.1 -97.1  48.4 
1990-94  -14.9 1.1 4.4  0.3  -9.1  -49.5  33.7 
1995-99 21.7 8.1  -0.1  9.8  39.5  -13.4  41.1 
2000-04  32.0  14.3  -1.5 15.8  60.6 -2.0 42.0 
a Assumes the rate of assistance in non-studied economies is the same as the average for the 
studied Asian economies, and that their share of the value of Asian agricultural production at 
undistorted prices is the same as their average share of the region’s agricultural GDP at 
distorted prices was 6 percent. (It was actually 4 percent in 2004, but would have been 
somewhat larger in earlier decades.) 
b Pakistan data for 1960-64 is 1961-64; Vietnam data for 1985-89 is 1986-1989; Taiwan data 
for 2000-04 is 2000-03.  
c The GSE guesstimate includes non-focus economies, plus the backcasting for China and 
India, such that it equals the sum of columns 1–4. 
 
d The last three columns include GSE estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965, 
which are based on the assumption that the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in those 
years was the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies for 1981-84 and 1965-
69, respectively, and that the gross value of production in those missing years is that which 
gives the same average share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 
1965-69, respectively. This assumption is conservative in the sense that for both countries the 
average NRA was probably even lower in earlier years, according to the authors of those 
country case studies. 
e Gross subsidy equivalents including assistance to nontradables and non-product-specific 
assistance. 




Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA estimates reported in Chapters 2-






Table 1.16: NRA and gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers in the Asian region, 
by product, 1955 to 2004 
 
 
(a) NRA (percent, at primary product level) 
   1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Barley  41  84  72 120 101 166 357 524 543 563 
Beef  38 25 34 44 95  101 94  145  106 85 
Cassava  na  na  na -23  -1  -9 -17 -11 -14 -10 
Chickpea  na 50 24  1  0  8 12  9 15 19 
Cocoa  na na -2 -3 -2 -2 -1 -2 -2  0 
Coconut  -29 -29 -24  -8  -3 -11 -19 -34 -22  -8 
Coffee  na na na -7 -4 -9 -5 -5 -1 -2 
Cotton  na  -19  12  63 7  -12  -2  -3 0 5 
Egg  -25  -21 19  0 -6 10 22 27 23 51 
Fruits & 
vegetables
a  na 0 0 0 0  -8  -3  -11  -6  -4 
Jute  na  na  na -30 -37 -29 -35 -38  -6 -39 
Maize  na -10  50  19  8 -20  -6 -15  8  13 
Milk  na  na  71 122 139 108 124  40  23  32 
Oilseeds
b  na 24 31 11 -5 22 35 21 22 22 
Palmoil  na -11 -11 -15 -14  -1  -2  2  -9  -3 
Pigmeat  -10 16 59 51 47  -41  -39 -3  7  4 
Poultry  -25  0 69 18 58 48 -2 20 17 12 
Rice  -10  -6 -25 -17 -13 -27  -6  -9  2  18 
Rubber  -16 -16 -14  -8 -19 -19 -14 -16  5  4 
Sorghum  na 82 42 55 12  7 36  7 21 16 
Sugar  na 96  163 13  2 37 39 13 20 43 
Tea  -22 -39 -39 -28 -22 -18 -19 -10  -8  -7 
Wheat  -33  -12 24 15 -3 -3 12  4 18 11 
Asian focus 
economies
c:  -11.1 -2.7  2.6  0.3 -0.4  -21.6  -15.2 -4.8  6.0 10.2 
 






Table 1.16 (continued): NRA and gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers in the 
Asian region, by product, 1955 to 2004 
 
(b) GSE by product (at undistorted farmgate prices, constant $US millions) 
   1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Barley  96 307 439 588 546 436 444 331 198 140 
Beef  21  49 107 162 670 893 822  1410  1236 831 
Cassava  na  na  na -86  -7 -87  -136 -84 -80 -41 
Chickpea  na  1201 499  40  0 193 268 149 224 255 
Cocoa  na na  0  0 -1 -1 -4 -2 -1  0 
Coconut  -135 -104 -110 -543 -256 -841 -841  -1103  -1017 -273 
Coffee  na  na  na -18 -42 -56 -34 -28 -14 -11 
Cotton  na -72 338  1820 302  -1008  -147  -227 -20 197 
Egg  -28 -29  33 -13 -41  70 150 213 199 282 
Fruits & 
vegetables
a  na  0  0  -5  19 -23014 -45349 -14769  -1304  -1239 
Jute  na  na  na -338 -275 -147 -193 -118  -12  -66 
Maize  na -36 991 620 230  -4041  -977  -2530  1336  1926 
Milk  na  na  605  756 9163 9044  10865 5162 4405 6459 
Oilseeds
b  na 1212 1150  455 -260 1582 2609 2015 2176 1743 
Palmoil  na  -13  -20 -210 -380  -70 -101  63 -680 -210 
Pigmeat  -62 136 668 897  1464  -35274  -16203  -1232  3443  2019 
Poultry  -26  10  217  78  831 1603 -354 1700 2806 2023 
Rice  -353  -299  -8741 -13809 -10843 -32220  -5945  -7328  2150  11789 
Rubber  -51 -438 -322 -356  -1389  -1230 -734 -813 -121  48 
Sorghum  na  2036  1017  1240 359 186 568  30 231 125 
Sugar  na  476 2875  -36 -395 3665 3186 1605 1969 3738 
Tea  -160 -210 -158 -125 -140 -112 -100  -53  -42  -40 
Wheat  -19  243 1732  928 -443 -513 2457  719 4593 2322 
Asian focus 
economies
d:  -704  771  1377  -7690  -902 -76336 -50000 -14889  21676  32010 
 
a Fruit and vegetables includes fruit and vegetables aggregates for India and China, and 
banana, cabbage, chillies, garlic, onions, peppers and potatoes for other economies. 
b Oilseeds includes groundnut, rapeseed, soybean and sunflower. 
c For covered products only. Weights are production valued at undistorted prices. 
d For covered products only, hence less than the totals in Table 1.15(a). 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), compiled from data reported in Chapters 2-12 of 





Table 1.17: Relative rates of assistance (RRA) to agriculture,
a Asian focus economies, 1955 
to 2004 
(percent)  
  1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
        K o r e a             
NRA Ag.  -3.3  4.9  16.3  46.1  71.8 118.6 159.8 197.6 164.8 171.9 
NRA  Non-Ag.  45.6 37.1 22.3 11.4  11.7 6.8 5.7 3.3 2.3 1.7 
RRA -32.6  -21.4  -4.8  30.5  53.9 104.8 145.9 188.2 158.8 167.3 
    Taiwan 
b             
NRA Ag.  -15.8  4.7  3.9  12.0  8.9 18.7 33.8 46.3 54.9 70.9 
NRA  Non-Ag.  8.8 9.3 8.8 7.5 7.0 5.2 4.5 2.6 1.8 1.0 
RRA -22.5  -4.2  -4.5  4.2  1.7 12.9 28.0 42.5 52.2 69.0 
    China
 b             
NRA  Ag.  -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -35.5 -14.3  6.6  5.9 
NRA  Non-Ag.  41.6 41.6 41.6 41.6 41.6 41.6 28.3 24.9  9.9  5.0 
RRA  -60.5 -60.5 -60.5 -60.5 -60.5 -60.5 -49.9 -31.1  -3.0  0.9 
    Northeast Asia             
NRA  Ag.  -43.1 -42.5 -42.2 -41.3 -40.0 -18.4 -26.2  -1.7  14.7  12.0 
NRA  Non-Ag.  40.9 40.8 40.0 39.7 39.4 71.1 18.8 15.0  6.8  3.3 
RRA  -58.2 -57.7 -56.6 -55.7 -53.7 -51.9 -38.0 -14.2  7.4  8.5 
    Indonesia              
NRA  Ag.  na  na  na -3.8 10.4 10.5 -1.9 -7.5 -9.7 13.9 
NRA Non-Ag.  na  na  na  27.7 27.7 27.7 26.5 17.6 10.6  8.1 
RRA na  na  na  -24.7  -13.6  -13.5 -22.5 -21.3 -18.3  5.4 
    Malaysia             
NRA  Ag.  na -7.6 -7.9 -9.4  -13.7 -4.9  1.4  2.6 -0.2  1.5 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na 7.4 7.0 7.1 6.5 5.2 3.9 2.8 2.0 0.9 
RRA  na -14.0 -13.9 -15.5 -18.9  -9.6  -2.4  -0.3  -2.2  0.6 
    Philippines             
NRA  Ag.  na -1.7 14.3 -6.0 -7.2 -4.0 15.8 16.7 35.7 23.5 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na 19.0 20.3 16.3 16.3 12.9 11.0  9.9  8.6  6.4 
RRA  na -17.4  -5.0 -19.8 -20.3 -14.9  4.3  6.1  24.9  15.9 
    Thailand             
NRA  Ag.  na  na  na  -23.1  -15.9 -2.3 -6.9 -6.4  1.8 -0.2 
NRA Non-Ag.  na  na  na  16.1 16.0 14.2 11.1 10.0  8.9  7.8 
RRA  na  na  na -33.7 -27.5 -14.4 -16.3 -14.9  -6.5  -7.4 
    Vietnam 
b             
NRA  Ag.  na na na na na na  -15.9  -26.4  0.0  20.7 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na na na na na  na 4.3  -11.2 1.5  20.8 
RRA  na na na na na na  -19.2  -17.4  -1.3  0.0 
    Southeast Asia             
NRA  Ag.  na  -5.8 5.6  -10.2 0.1 4.9  -0.9  -4.7 0.0  12.1 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na 11.5 15.4 20.2 22.0 21.1 18.0 11.5  8.2  8.1 
RRA  na -15.5  -8.5 -25.3 -18.0 -13.4 -16.1 -14.5  -7.7  3.7 
    Bangladesh             
NRA  Ag.  na na na na  3.1  -3.9  17.5  -2.4  -8.0  4.0 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na na na na 28.4 22.4 28.5 33.3 29.0 23.4 
RRA  na na na na  -19.7  -21.5  -8.6 -26.7 -28.6 -15.8 
    India 
b             
NRA Ag.  5.2  5.2  5.2  12.6  -7.4 4.1  67.5 2.0  -2.3  15.4 
NRA Non-Ag.  113.0  113.0  113.0  83.1 64.8 59.3 48.6 15.9 12.6  5.2 
RRA  -56.3 -56.3 -56.3 -38.3 -43.8 -33.5  11.7 -12.1 -12.9  12.5 
    Pakistan 
b             
NRA  Ag.  na -1.0 21.7  9.3  -11.8 -9.3 -5.9  -10.2 -2.6  1.5 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na 169.7 224.5 146.7 44.0 48.3 45.1 39.3 27.0 14.6 
RRA  na -63.8 -62.4 -55.9 -38.6 -38.6 -35.1 -35.2 -23.0 -11.5 
    Sri Lanka             
NRA  Ag.  -2.7 -25.7 -27.6 -18.5 -29.0 -15.4 -11.2  -1.3  14.0  10.8 
NRA Non-Ag.  104.9  124.6  138.4  70.7 52.9 57.1 59.0 47.1 36.4 22.9 
RRA  -52.5 -66.6 -68.0 -51.6 -53.5 -46.2 -44.3 -32.9 -16.3  -9.8 
   South Asia            
NRA  Ag.  4.7 3.9 4.4 9.7  -7.7 1.8  47.1 0.2  -2.4  12.7 
NRA Non-Ag.  112.7  115.5  143.1  81.7 57.8 54.6 39.9 18.6 15.0 10.1 





Table 1.17 (continued): Relative rates of assistance (RRA) to agriculture
a, Asian focus 
economies, 1955 to 2004 
  1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
   Asian focus economies (unweighted average) 
c  
NRA  Ag.  -12.1 -8.3 -2.5 -3.1 -3.6  5.9 18.0 15.5 19.6 25.2 
NRA  Non-Ag.  62.8 65.2 72.0 42.8 28.8 22.1 19.3 12.3 10.0  8.4 
RRA  -44.7 -38.0 -34.4 -27.0 -22.2 -13.2  -1.2  2.9  8.7  15.5 
    Asian focus economies (weighted average) 
d  
NRA  Ag.  -29.0 -27.7 -26.9 -24.3 -31.3 -18.8 -11.2  -2.6  7.5  11.7 
NRA  Non-Ag.  66.8 67.1 70.9 50.3 50.3 38.3 15.4 14.9  9.6  4.3 
RRA  -57.5 -56.4 -55.3 -47.9 -44.7 -40.8 -22.8 -15.2  -1.9  7.1 
Dispersion of 
national RRAs 
e  21.9 30.7 36.2 37.6 41.5 51.9 56.0 65.1 50.5 50.8 
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
b Pakistan data for 1960-64 is 1961-64; Vietnam data for 1985-89 is 1986-1989; Taiwan data 
for 2000-04 is 2000-03. Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the 
assumption that the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as 
the average NRA estimates for those economies for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and 
that the gross value of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average 
share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
This NRA assumption is conservative in the sense that for both countries the average NRA 
was probably even lower in earlier years, according to the authors of those country case 
studies. 
c Simple averages of the above (weighted) national averages.  
d Weighted averages of the above national averages, using weights based on gross value of 
national agricultural production at undistorted prices. 
e Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the standard deviation around a weighted mean of 
the national agricultural sector NRAs for the region each year. 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA and RRA estimates reported in 





Table 1.18: Relative per capita income,
a agricultural comparative advantage index,
b and 
nominal and relative rates of assistance to tradable agriculture, Asian focus economies, 
2000‑04 
 






Korea 212 26 137.3  167.3
Taiwan 232 28 61.3 69.0
China 21 58 5.9 0.9
Indonesia 17 173 12.0 5.4
Malaysia 74 107 1.2 0.6
Philippines 18 67 22.0 15.9
Thailand 38 204 -0.2 -7.4
Vietnam 8 301 21.2 0.0
Bangladesh 7 93 2.7 -15.8
India 9 143 15.8 12.5
Pakistan 10 137 1.2 -11.5
Sri Lanka  16 254 9.5 -9.8
Asian focus economies
c   20 80 12.0  7.1
 
a Income per capita relative to the world average, 2000-04. (World=100) 
b Agriculture and food’s share of national exports as a percentage of agriculture and food’s 
share of global exports, 2000-04 
c. Unweighted average for relative per capita income and agricultural comparative advantage; 
weighted averages for NRA and RRA.  
 
Sources: Columns 1 and 2: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007); columns 3 and 4: 
Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA and RRA estimates reported in Chapters 





Table 1.19: Relationships between nominal rates of assistance and some of its determinants, 




variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
              
Ln GDP per 






























































































a          
0.03* 
(-0.01)          
-0.07* 






b       
0.11* 
(-0.03)          
-0.13 
(-0.09)          
-0.03 


























              
R
2  0.10 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.07 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.28 0.29 0.29 
No.  of  obs. 2766 2766 2594 2594 2766 2766 2594 2594 2766 2766 2594 2594 
Country FE  No No No No  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE  No No No No No No No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
 
a Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in 
national exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of global exports (world=1). 
 
b Net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed food 
products (world=1). 
 
Notes: Dependent variable for regressions is NRA by commodity and year. Results are OLS 
estimates, with standard errors in parentheses and significance levels shown at the 99%(*). 
The main explanatory variable is ln GDP per capita in $10,000s.  
 





Table 1.20: Percentage consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of covered 
farm products,
a Asian focus economies, 1955 to 2003  
 
(a)  aggregate CTEs by country
b 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Korea  6.6  14.5  39.7  63.9 114.3 148.5 176.4 144.9 143.8 
Taiwan  15.0 17.2 22.2 15.7 36.4 82.7  116.5  136.8  166.5 
China  na na na na  -38.7  -35.8  -14.2  0.4  0.2 
Indonesia  na  na -9.0  6.4  8.4 -4.3 -6.7  -11.2 18.3 
Malaysia  11.1 1.4 3.6  18.1  18.1  28.8  15.7 2.8 6.1 
Philippines -5.5  12.0  -4.5  -7.4 -3.1 23.7 22.3 40.2 30.6 
Thailand  na  na  -27.3  -19.6 -5.7 -6.1 -6.8  3.1  2.3 
Vietnam  na na na na na  -11.5  -24.3  1.0  19.3 
Bangladesh  na na na  3.1  -4.6  17.0  -2.9  -9.3  4.4 
India  na -19.1 -21.8 -10.8  -0.6  14.1  -8.7  -7.4  2.9 
Pakistan  0.7 38.0 14.4  -11.2 -5.5  1.2  -13.2 -5.8  3.6 
SriLanka  -9.7 -14.7  -2.6 -19.8 -11.5  -6.1  3.5  20.4  20.7 
Asian focus economies: 
  Unweighted 
average
  7.2  7.1  1.8  3.8 10.5 21.6 21.5 26.3 31.7 
  Weighted 
average
c  8.8 -11.3 -14.6  -1.8 -14.5 -12.7  -4.0  1.2  1.7 
  Dispersion 
of national 
CTEs








Table 1.20 (continued): Percentage consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of 
covered farm products,
a Asian focus economies, 1955 to 2003  
 
(percent, at primary product level) 
 
(b) Regional CTEs by product 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Barley  65  97  57 120 326 411 341 335 
Beef  32 41 99  110 95  156  106  109 
Cassava  na -22  1  -8 -13  -8 -12  -9 
Chickpea  5 0 0 3 5 0 3 7 
Cocoa  -3 -4 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3  0 
Coconut  -24  -9  -3 -12 -22 -36 -25  -9 
Coffee  na -17 -11 -18 -13  -8  -3  -1 
Cotton  -5 14 -4  -16  -11  -15 -6 -3 
Egg  19  0 -6 10 22 27 23 38 
Fruit & vegetables
e  0  0 -26 -45 -18  0  0  0 
Jute  na -30 -37 -30 -36 -39  -7 -39 
Maize  23 -1  6 -4 17 -7  8 14 
Milk  71 122 139 108 123  39  23  34 
Oilseeds
f  25 15 26 30 29 25 27 27 
Palmoil  -1 -9 -3 10  1 12  -15 -6 
Pigmeat  58  49  47 -37 -38  -6  1  1 
Poultry  69 18 58 49 -2 17  3  2 
Rice  -41 -37 -17 -15  -4  -8  0  18 
Rubber  -52  -6 -19 -23 -19 -11  2  2 
Sorghum  9 30  7  0 23 -5 10  0 
Sugar  121  0 -3 31 31  8 16 43 
Tea  -58 -29 -19 -14 -17 -10 -15 -17 
Wheat  8  -1  -7 7  22  15 8 1 
Asian focus economies:         
  Weighted average
c  -11 -15  -2 -14 -13  -4  1  2 
  Dispersion of regional 
product CTEs
g  59 50 47 56 92  103 82 82 
a Assumes the CTE is the same as the NRA derived from trade measures (that is, not 
including any input taxes/subsidies or domestic producer price subsidies/taxes), except for 
rice, barley, wheat and sorghum in Korea and wheat in Taiwan.  
b Pakistan data for 1960-64 is 1961-64; Vietnam data for 1985-89 is 1986-89; and Taiwan 
data for 2000-04 is 2000-03.  
c Weights are consumption valued at undistorted prices, where consumption (from FAO) is 
production plus imports net of exports plus change in stocks of the covered products. 
d Simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of the 
national average CTE. 
e Fruit and vegetables includes fruit and vegetables aggregates for India and China, and 
banana, cabbage, chillies, garlic, onions, peppers and potatoes for other economies. 
f Oilseeds includes groundnut, rapeseed, soybean and sunflower. 
g Simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of the 
regional average CTE for the covered products shown above. 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), compiled from NRABS estimates and production 
data reported in Chapters 2-12 of this book and self sufficiency ratios based on FAO data to 





Table 1.21: Value of consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of covered farm 
products, Asian focus economies, 1955 to 2003  





   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Korea  635 1607 6020 9497  13019  19275  16969  14617 
Taiwan  675  466  636 1287 2586 3711 4284 3964 
China  na  na  na -62859 -33988  923  58257  44497 
Indonesia  na  -1676 2147 3378 -500 -884  -2524 4849 
Malaysia  5  2 163 196 208 169  43  67 
Philippines  485 -890 -467  96 1808 2059 4178 2509 
Thailand  na  -1552  -1253 -347 -229 -344  168  83 
Vietnam  na na na na  -36  -939  320  991 
Bangladesh  na  -1546  771 -668 1193  -75 -621  300 
India  -17659  -27664  -12120 -2586 11985 -6025 -5811  9079 
Pakistan  1636 -317 -698 -433  27 -883 -543  189 
Sri  Lanka  -38  46  -107 -94 -26 124 206  99 
Asian focus economies 
  -9961 -24347  -3060 -46901 -40694  -8400  17749  32686 
All Asian economies
b  -10597 -25901  -3255 -49894 -43292  -8936  18882  34773 
 
(b) CTE per capita 
 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Korea  21.2  48.3 165.2 242.1 312.6 440.7 370.5 308.3 
Taiwan  50.5  30.5  37.8  69.8 131.4 179.4 202.1 175.1 
China  na  na  na -60.9 -30.6  0.8  46.6  34.2 
Indonesia  na  -13.3 15.3 21.6 -2.9 -4.7  -12.4 22.3 
Malaysia  0.5  0.2 12.7 13.5 12.6  9.0  2.0  2.8 
Philippines  14.5  -23.0  -10.5  1.9 31.7 32.2 58.6 31.9 
Thailand  na  -40.5  -28.9 -7.2 -4.4 -6.2  2.8  1.3 
Vietnam  na na na na  -0.6  -13.6  4.3  12.3 
Bangladesh  na  -22.2  9.8 -7.5 11.7 -0.7 -4.8  2.1 
India  -34.1  -47.6  -18.7 -3.6 15.0 -6.8 -6.0  8.7 
Pakistan 28.5  -4.9  -9.4  -5.0 0.3  -7.6  -4.1 1.3 
Sri  Lanka  -3.3  3.6 -7.7 -6.3 -1.6  7.2 11.4  5.3 
Asian focus economies 
  -5.9 -12.7  -1.4 -20.2 -16.0  -3.0  5.9  10.2 
All Asian economies





Table 1.21 (continued): Percentage consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of 
covered farm products,
a Asian economies, 1955 to 2003 
 
(constant 2000 US$ million at primary product level, using the US GDP deflator) 
 
(c) Regional CTEs by product
  
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Barley  430 577 442 376 441 400 276 226 
Beef  118  172  966 1291 1108 2934 2257 2264 
Cassava  0 -8  0 -5 -7 -5 -6 -3 
Chickpea  150 0 0  91  121 0  58  125 
Cocoa  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coconut  -76 -564 -239 -877 -880  -1104  -1087 -367 
Coffee  0 -23 -22 -23 -15 -10 -12  -3 
Cotton  -211  563 -165  -1289 -643  -1045 -477 -178 
Egg  34 -13 -41  70 150 215 200 234 
Fruit & vegetables
c  0  -7  -3 -23355 -46810 -14771  -1252  -916 
Jute  0  0 -189  -92 -146  -86  -9  -46 
Maize  578 -118  186 -757 1800 -855 1483 2037 
Milk  608  759 9183 9099  10904 5150 4422 6676 
Oilseeds
d  211 -446 -674 1748 3003 2344 2945 2973 
Palmoil  0  -8  -9  50 -17  98  -255 -70 
Pigmeat  636  839 1418  -28008  -14856  -1449 3270 2222 
Poultry  0 0 7 5 6  34  37  40 
Rice  -16207 -25199 -13033 -14210  -3768  -6261  -939  11059 
Rubber  -3  -3 -49 -72 -77 -87 -21  10 
Sorghum  343 854 230  -8 379  -118  99  0 
Sugar  2173 -835 -913 3294 2812 1029 1565 3953 
Tea  -17 -24 -27 -16 -16 -10 -22 -22 
Wheat  1076 -905 -957 2223 5147 3429 2397  151 
Asian focus 
economies:  -9942 -24312  -3065 -48839 -41683  -8411  17735  32753 
a Pakistan data for 1960-64 is 1961-64; Vietnam data for 1985-89 is 1986-1989; and Taiwan 
data for 2000-04 is 2000-03.  
b Assumes the rate of assistance to covered products in non-studied economies is the same as 
the average for the studied Asian economies, and that their share of the value of Asian 
agricultural production at undistorted prices is the same as their average share of the region’s 
agricultural GDP at distorted prices during 1990-2004, which was 6 percent. These dollar 
amounts do not include non-covered farm products, which amount to almost one-third of 
agricultural output (see last row of Table 1.10), nor any mark-up that might be applied along 
the value chain. 
c Fruit and vegetables includes fruit and vegetables aggregates for India and China, and 
banana, cabbage, chillies, garlic, onions, peppers and potatoes for other economies. 
d Oilseeds includes groundnut, rapeseed, soybean and sunflower. 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), compiled from NRABS estimates and production 
data reported in Chapters 2-12 of this book and self sufficiency ratios based on FAO data to 





Figure 1.1: Real GDP per capita in Asian and other developing focus economies relative to 
the United States, 1950 to 2006 
(United States = 100) 
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Africa Latin America Europe's transition economies Asia (excl Japan)
 
 
a Shown relative to the United States which is set as the numeraire at 100. Southeast Asia is 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. South Asia is Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  
Source: Based on 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars from Maddison (2003) to 2001, 










































a There is no data for Vietnam in 1980-84. Estimates for China pre-1981 are based on the 
assumption that the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as 
the average NRA estimates for the country for 1981-84, and that the gross value of 
production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of 
production in total world production in 1981-84. 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA estimates reported in Chapters 2-





Figure 1.3: Nominal rates of assistance, by product, Asian region, 1980-84 and 2000-04 
(percent) 
 
(a) unweighted average across 12 economies 




















a average across 12 economies 
 


















a Weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices [each NRA 
(by country, by product) is weighted by the country’s value of production of that commodity 
in a given year]. Products with less than 1 percent of the gross value of regional production 
are excluded. These include: cocoa, onion, chilies, barley, jute, sunflower, garlic, peppers, 
cabbage, cassava, potato, egg, tea, coffee, sorghum, rapeseed, chickpea, groundnut, and beef.  
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA estimates reported in Chapters 2-





Figure 1.4: Nominal rates of assistance for rice, milk and sugar, individual Asian focus 








































a Data for Vietnam in 1980–84 is that for the first 5-year period available, which is 1986–89 
for rice and 1990–95 for sugar.  
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA estimates reported in Chapters 2-





Figure 1.5: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all
a agricultural 
products, Asian region, 1955 to 2004 
 
(percent)  
























1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
import-competing exportables total
 
      
a The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and importable averages because 
assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance is also included. 
b The exportables, import-competing and total estimates are based on China pre-1981 and 
India pre-1965 values estimated on the assumption that the nominal rate of assistance to 
agriculture in those years was the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies 
for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value of production in those 
missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of production in total world 
production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA estimates reported in Chapters 2-






Figure 1.6: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable products 
and relative rate of assistance,
a Asia region, 1955 to 2004 
 
 (percent)  
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t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA estimates reported in Chapters 2-





Figure 1.7: Relative rates of assistance to agriculture,
a Asian focus economies
b and 






































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
b No estimates for Vietnam in 1980-84 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA estimates reported in Chapters 2-






Figure 1.8: NRAs and RRAs, China and India, 1964 to 2005 
(percent) 
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Figure 1.9: Nominal and relative rates of assistance,
a Asian, African and Latin American 










































a 5-year weighted averages with value of production at undistorted prices as weights.  
b Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the 
nominal rates of assistance to agriculture and national share or regional agricultural 
production in those years were the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies 
for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawn from NRA estimates reported in Chapters 2-





Figure 1.10: Income distribution, Asian regions and the world,
a 2000 
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(b) South Asia region 
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a The vertical line is the US$1/day poverty line in 1993 PPP terms 
 





Figure 1.11: Relationships between real GDP per capita, comparative advantage, and 
agricultural NRA and RRA,
a Asian focus economies, 1955 to 2005   
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Ln real GDP per capita
ASIA NRA obs ASIA fitted values
 
 
Coefficient Standard  error  R
2 
0.17 0.01 0.19 
 










-1 0 1 2 3
Ln real GDP per capita
ASIA RRA obs ASIA fitted values
 
 
Coefficient Standard  error  R
2 
0.27 0.01 0.46 
 
Notes: Dependent variable for regressions is NRA or RRA by country and year, expressed as 
a fraction. Results are OLS estimates. The explanatory variable is the natural log of real GDP 





Figure 1.11 (continued): Relationships between real GDP per capita, comparative advantage, 
and agricultural NRA and RRA,
a Asian focus economies, 1960 to 2004     
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Coefficient Standard  error  R
2 
-0.12 0.02 0.08 
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RCA
ASIA rra obs ASIA fitted values
 
 
Coefficient Standard  error  R
2 
-0.26 0.03 0.09 
 
a Dependent variable for regressions is NRA or RRA by country and year, expressed as a 
fraction. Results are OLS estimates. The explanatory variable revealed comparative 
advantage, which is the share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio 
of that sector’s share of global merchandise exports. 
b Using 5-year average data for revealed comparative advantage. 
 
Source: Based on economic data in Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007) and NRA 






Figure 1.12: Rice NRA and international rice price, Asian region, 1970 to 2005 
(left axis is int’l price in USD, right axis is NRA in percent) 
 






















Correlation coefficient is -0.75 
 
(c) Southeast Asian focus economies 
 






































Correlation coefficient is -0.59 



























































































































































































































Source: Authors’ compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)  
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Figure 1.14: Relationship between RRA and the trade bias index for agriculture, Asian focus 
economies,
a 1980–84 and 2000–04 
 



































































































a There are no data for Vietnam in 1980–84.   
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Source:  Based on estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
 